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Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against
Genetic Entitlement
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This Article makes the case against a nascent consensus among feminist and other
progressive scholars about ments parental nrghts. Most progressive proposals to arfon
parentage law focus on making it easier for men to assert parental nghts, especially when they
are not married to the mother of the child These proposals may seek, for example, to requir
the state to make more extensive efforts to locate biological fathes, to requre pregnant women
to notify men of theirimpendingpatemity or to require new mothers to give biological fathers
access to infants.
These proposals disregard the mothers existing parental nghts and tiansfer too much
power from women to men. Although they directly affect only a particular class of legal
disputes about genetic fathers and adoption, their implications tretch not only to other kinds of
custody disputes but also to the lawk treatment of sex and gender differnces in reproduction
more broadly The principle of genetic entitlement hat underlies these proposals is male-
centered and therefore an undesiable basis for the law ofreproduction and parntage.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article makes the case against a nascent consensus among
feminist and other progressive scholars about men's parental rights.
Consensus is forming around a superficial equality standard that
declares mothers and fathers to be equal, and thus to have equal
parental rights, at the time a child is born.' Accordingly, most
progressive proposals to reform parentage law -focus on making it
easier for men to assert parental rights, especially when they are not
1. See sources cited mfra note 65 (arguing that the procedural rights of genetic
fathers should be strengthened); source cited rnia note 77 (arguing that weak rights for
unwed fathers also harm and denigrate unwed mothers); sources cited hOfid note 95 (arguing
that current law imposes a reverse form of coverture on men); sources cited ifa note 114
(advocating for theoretical approaches that aim to avoid associating women more strongly
than men with parenthood); sources cited ifa note 159 (advocating stronger parental rights
for fathers in order to encourage male involvement with children).
Although many of the principles at play in this Article apply to situations involving
children conceived through reproductive technology, as I have discussed in other work, see
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429 (2007)
[hereinafter Hendricks, Essentially aMothez]; Jennifer S. Hendricks, Not of Woman Born: A
Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 399 (2011) [hereinafter Hendricks, Not of
Woman Born], my focus here is on the "unwed father cases" and therefore on children
conceived through sexual intercourse. Within this context, I use the term "birth mother," or
often simply "mother," to refer to a person who gestates and gives birth to a child. I use
"father," with various modifiers, to refer to the person who did not gestate the child but who
contributed genetic material via sexual intercourse.
While recognizing that not all people who self-identify as women experience pregnancy
and that some people who do not self-identify as women do, throughout this Article, I also
refer to mothers as female and fathers as male, and to some extent I treat the rights of mothers
as the rights of women and the rights of fathers as the rights of men. I do so in part for the
sake of linguistic convenience but also because the potential for pregnancy is central to the
legal construction of gender.
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married to the mother of the child. These proposals may seek, for
example, to require states to make more extensive efforts to locate
biological fathers, to require pregnant women to notify men of their
impending paternity, or to require new mothers to give biological
fathers access to their infants.
These proposals directly affect a particular class of legal disputes
about a genetic father's ability to block an adoption sought by the
birth mother. However, their implications stretch not only to other
kinds of custody disputes but also to the law's treatment of sex and
gender differences in reproduction more broadly. They "raise
fundamental questions about the meaning of parenthood [and]
provide a rich landscape for examining the law's expressive
functions."2 In particular, proposals for strengthening the rights of
biological fathers implicitly adopt a rule of genetic entitlement, by
which I mean the principle of giving automatic, full parental rights to
fathers based on genetics alone. The principle of genetic entitlement
is closely related to genetic essentialism, which is an ideological
commitment to genes and DNA as "the core, the most important
constituent part of who we are as human beings."' My argument here
is that both genetic essentialism and its corollary, genetic entitlement,
are patriarchal and thus undesirable bases for the law of reproduction
and parentage.
Part II summarizes the case law defining the constitutional rights
of fathers and describes how states have implemented those rights.
While states take a fairly uniform approach to married fathers, they
have created a variety of different rules governing the rights of unwed
fathers because each state is trying to reconcile two conflicting
impulses: (1) a commitment to a genetic-essentialist definition of
parenthood that is rooted in patriarchy' and (2) the impulse to
2. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expresshg Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 294 (1988).
For other critiques of genetic definitions of parenthood, see, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The
Geneic Tie, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 209 (1995); Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian Centered Cidque of
"Genedc Parenthood," 9 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 591 (2006).
3. Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproducdve Technologies: ARTs,
Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2003). Katharine Baker
makes a similar argument; what I call "genetic entitlement," she calls "the DNA default."
Katharine K. Baker, The DNA Default and Its Discontents: Establishing Modem Parenthood
96 B.U. L. REv. 2037 (2016).
4. Patirihyrefers both to the systemic subordination of women and to the "law of
the father" that defines identity and descent through the male line. BARBARA KATZ
ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL
SOCIETY 34-41 (1989). See genenuily Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption,
2 017 ] 475
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streamline adoption of children born to unmarried mothers by
limiting the rights of unmarried fathers. Broadly speaking, states have
achieved this reconciliation by adopting a substantive rule of genetic
entitlement but then making that entitlement procedurally difficult for
low-income fathers to vindicate.
My concern is with the substantive law rather than the
procedure, and in Part III I argue that genetic entitlement is
inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent on parental rights
and with the requirements of sex equality. Supreme Court precedent
confers parental rights only when genetic parenthood is combined
with a caretaking relationship with the child. Therefore, at the time of
birth, the birth mother is the only "constitutional parent"'-the parent
who already has an established relationship with the child and
therefore has constitutionally protected parental rights. Part III
proposes a doctrinal structure for weighing the mother's existing
rights against other interests. I argue that a state wanting to give
automatic genetic rights to fathers must justify overriding the mother's
parental rights under constitutional standards.
Part IV then considers circumstances under which feminists
sometimes support overriding the mother's rights with a genetic
entitlement for the father. First, many commenters believe that
strengthening men's parental rights would recognize men as
caretakers and encourage their participation in child-rearing. Subpart
IVA argues that this hope-that stronger genetic entitlements will
translate into greater parental commitments-is too amorphous to
justify infringement of mothers' constitutional parental rights.
Second, under some circumstances, stronger rights for fathers could
help protect vulnerable parents from exploitation by the adoption
system. Although it is a closer case, subpart IVB argues that this goal
would be better served directly, by reforming the adoption process, as
well as by providing more social support for birth mothers. In all
contexts, I argue that feminists should be skeptical of proposals
claiming to fix deeply entrenched and complicated social problems
with a simple rule change that transfers constitutional rights from
and Sex Equalty Gender-Neutraity and the Perpetuation ofPatriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
60(1995).
5. E. Gary Spitko, The Constitudonal Functon ofBiologica/ Paternity: Evidence of
the Biological Mother's Consent o the Biological Father's Co-Parnting of Her Chil4 48
ARIZ. L. REv. 97, 99 (2006).
476 [Vol. 91:473
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women to men, especially when that rule change has deep roots in
sexist, patriarchal theories of reproduction.
II. THE RIGHTS OF GENETIC FATHERS
When first faced with the issue of the parental rights of fathers,
the Supreme Court took birth mothers' parental rights as given and
developed a "biology-plus-relationship" test for the rights of genetic
fathers.6 This test meant that men did not acquire parental rights by
virtue of biological fatherhood alone. Instead, biological fatherhood
had to be joined with an established relationship of day-to-day
caretaking of the child. While states could no longer disregard
unmarried fathers or treat them as legal strangers to their children,
neither did the Court elevate the genetic tie to the sine qua non of
constitutional parenthood.
The states responded by, on the one hand, endowing the genetic
tie with more importance than the Supreme Court had given it but, on
the other hand, seeking to cut off the genetic father efficiently when
doing so would facilitate adoption.! A key fault line in these
responses is the role of the mother: whether she controls initial access
to the child-and thus whether the father is able to satisfy the biology-
plus-relationship test-or whether the father's genetic tie, standing
alone, gives him enforceable rights against her. Variation in how
states resolve this question has set the stage for jurisdictional and
choice of law problems, which in turn produce manipulation by
parties and calls for a national solution.
A. The Supreme Court and Unwed Fathers
The Supreme Court formulated the biology-plus-relationship test
in a series of cases in the 1970s.' Rejecting the old system, in which
6. See infra text accompanying notes 8-12.
7. See in text accompanying notes 65-67.
8. The unwed father cases have been described and summarized many times. For
my own more detailed analysis of the cases, see Hendricks, Essendally a Mother, supra note
1, at 434-36, analyzing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); 437-38, analyzing Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); 438-39, analyzing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); and 439-41, analyzing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
The first use of the phrase "biology-plus-relationship" to describe this test appears to be
by Elise Schlackman. Elise Schlackman, Note, Unwed Fathers' Rights in New York: How
Far Does the Protection Extend, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 199, 199 (1993). The shorter
term "biology plus" was used by Daniel C. Zinman. Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows
2017] 477
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men could acquire parental status only through marriage or formal
establishment of paternity, the Court held that the determinants of
constitutional protection were biological parenthood plus a caretaking
relationship with the child.9 The biology-plus-relationship test
recognized that a birth mother, by gestating and giving birth, satisfied
both criteria, but that for fathers, biological parenthood did not
automatically create a relationship that demanded full parental rights."o
A man's status as a biological father was said to give him a unique
"opportunity" to become a legal father, but to take advantage of that
opportunity required affirmative steps on his part: he had to establish
a concrete parental relationship with the child." Once he did so, he
became a full-fledged constitutional parent, on par with the mother.2
Because biological connection is easy to prove, the key questions
about the biology-plus-relationship test pertain to the relationship
prong. They are:
* What "counts" for establishing the relationship, and how much
of it is needed? For example, can the father establish a
relationship with the child vicariously, through the mother, by
caring for her while she is pregnant? After birth, how involved
must he be and for how long?
* What rights, if any, does he have before he meets that threshold
for full-blown parental rights? In particular, is failure to
Best: The Unwed Father's Right To Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 972 (1992).
9. See Quillohl, 434 U.S. at 256 (describing the necessary relationship as one that
involves "the daily supervision, education, protection, [and] care of the child").
10. See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, supra note 1, at 443 ("[T]he Court . .. used
motherhood as the model for crafting the biology-plus-relationship test to accommodate
fathers' physical disadvantage. As the Court later explained, it makes sense to allow a man
to acquire parental rights comparable to a mother's by creating a test 'in terms the male can
fulfill."' (quoting Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001))).
11. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 ("The significance of the biological connection is that it
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship
with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility
for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship .... If he
fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen to his
opinion of where the child's best interests lie."); id. at 259-60 (noting a "clear distinction
between a mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility").
12. . Cf Spitko, supra note 5, at 99 (referring to the biological mother as the "initial
constitutional parent"). Because this point is often misunderstood, it is worth noting here that
gestation satisfies the biology-plus-relationship standard but does not give mothers an
essential or enduring supremacy in parental rights. Once they meet that standard, all legal
parents have equally protected constitutional rights.
478 [Vol. 91:473
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establish the relationship excused-and parental rights thereby
awarded based on genes alone-if the mother denies him access
to the child? Put another way, does the father's genetic tie to the
child automatically entitle him to access to the child, or does he
depend upon the mother's initial consent and cooperation?
This Article does not try to answer the first set of questions." It
focuses on the second set: the cases in which the relationship
requirement, whatever it may be, has not been met. The question,
then, is what entitlements arise from genetic parenthood standing
alone. Most states and many feminist scholars have taken the view
that a man has a genetic entitlement to establish a relationship with his
biological child if he chooses to do so, even over the mother's
objection, unless he is proven unfit.4 This Article argues that this
genetic entitlement is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and
that a regime of genetic entitlement would be based on and would
perpetuate patriarchy.
The starting point for the doctrinal analysis is Lehr v
Robertson." Jonathan Lehr was the biological father of a baby whose
mother, Lorraine Robertson, disappeared with the child shortly after
13. Some preliminary thoughts: A purely child-centered definition of parenthood
would give less weight to prebirth conduct; Lehr can be read to support this approach, since
Lehr and Robertson's relationship appears to have remained intact until approximately the
time of the birth. In addition, pregnancy can be a dangerous time for some women, and a
hospital visit for giving birth may be the best available time for breaking off a destructive
relationship. See A. Rachel Camp, Coercing Pregnancy, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
275, 291-92 (2015) ("Women who experience abuse in their relationships routinely report
that such abuse begins or intensifies during pregnancy or immediately following the birth of a
child. Nearly one-third of women who experience domestic violence report that the first
abusive incident occurred during pregnancy.... Violence during pregnancy is particularly
prevalent when the pregnancy is unintended." (footnotes omitted)). On the other hand, in my
view, adult heartbreak should matter too, and it is a stretch to say that a relationship
requirement applied to a very young infant is protecting only the child's attachment.
Moreover, to the extent that the biology-plus-relationship test serves as a substitute for
marriage and as evidence that the mother consented to the man's becoming a part of the
child's family, prebirth conduct should be considered. See generally Spitko, supra note 5, at
104-05 (arguing that marriage indicates the mother's prior consent to coparenting; a similar
argument could be made with respect to coparenting plans made by an unmarried couple
during pregnancy). I would be inclined to count prebirth conduct for the sake of protecting
the father's emotional investment and attachment to the developing child. However,
evidence of abusive behavior or the mother's lack of consent to coparenting at the time of
birth should mitigate the weight given to that investment, regardless of the parents' marital
status.
14. See infa subpart II.B.1.
15. Lehr, 463 U.S. 248.
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the birth." She married another man, and the new couple petitioned
for a stepparent adoption when the child was just over two years old."
In the meantime, Lehr had been searching for the child. He hired
private investigators, filed a petition for a declaration of paternity, and
sought visitation rights." Despite knowing of these efforts, the
mother, stepfather, and judge finalized the adoption without giving
Lehr notice of the proceeding." At the time, the law did not allow a
child to have more than two parents, so adoption by the stepfather
necessarily terminated any claim Lehr might have had to the child.20
When he eventually appealed this decision to the Supreme
Court, Lehr lost because he had never established an actual, day-to-
day, family relationship with his genetic child.2' Endorsing portions of
a dissent from a prior case, the Lehr Court adopted the view that
"[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more
enduring."2 2  Even though Lehr went to some lengths to try to
establish a relationship with the child, the Court found his ultimate
failure determinative. By dismissing Lehr's efforts, the Court raised
the possibility that an unwed mother has the chance, immediately
after birth, to exercise a de facto veto over the father's ability to
establish parental rights.23
The Ler Court, however, left an important ambiguity in its
analysis, one that remains unresolved. The ambiguity goes to the
heart of the question of what the Constitution protects when it protects
parental rights: does the Constitution protect only existing
relationships that go beyond genetics and constitute full-fledged
16. Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 250 (majority opinion).
18. Id. at 252, 268-69 (White, J., dissenting). The adoption petition may have been
precipitated by Lehr's efforts to contact Robertson about the child. Id at 269. These facts
describing Lehr's efforts are drawn from the Lehr dissent and were largely ignored by the
majority. The majority, however, was obligated to accept Lehr's version of the facts since
the case had been decided in the state courts without any factual hearing. Id at 253 (majority
opinion) (stating that Lehr's petition was denied after "written and oral argument").
19. Id. at 250; id. at 268-69 (White, J., dissenting). This paragraph and the following
one are drawn largely from my summary of Lehrin a prior article See Hendricks, Essentially
a Mother, supra note 1, at 439-40.
20. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 270 (White, J., dissenting).
21. Id at 260-62 (majority opinion).
22. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(endorsed by the Lebrmajority, 463 U.S. at 259-60).
23. Id at 397 (suggesting that the mother could "place a limit" on the father's claim,
a suggestion that was endorsed by the Lehrmajority, 463 U.S. at 260 n. 16).
480 [Vol. 91:473
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parenting, or does the Constitution also protect a genetic father's
opportunity to form such a relationship with the child?24  This
question has important implications for the dynamic between the
mother and father. In one interpretation, the mother controls access to
the child and can therefore decide whether a protected relationship
with the father ever comes into existence. In the other interpretation,
the state is constitutionally required to compel the mother to make the
child available to the father.
The first interpretation finds support in the Court's clear focus,
in Lebr and other cases, on the presence or absence of a caretaking
relationship between the father and the child." That focus is
consistent with the modem, child-centered perspective on parental
rights.26  Moreover, based on the evidence described in the various
opinions in Lehr, it is hard to say that Jonathan Lehr was at fault in
any meaningful way for his failure to have a relationship with his
genetic daughter.27 Therefore, Lehr could stand for the proposition
that the genetic fathers' rights depend solely on whether he has
formed a sufficient relationship with the child, regardless of the
reason why or why not.
On the other hand, some of the Court's language focuses on the
father's personal culpability, and the Court managed to find fault even
24. David D. Meyer, Fanly Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the
Faultless Father, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 753, 758-69 (1999). Lehrstrongly implies that the father's
"opportunity interest" is protected by procedural due process, meaning that he is entitled to a
fair chance to demonstrate that he has satisfied the biology-plus-relationship test. The
question is whether genetic fatherhood alone establishes a substantive right, enforceable
against the mother, to an opportunity to satisfy the relationship prong of the test.
25. Seeid at 763-64 (discussing this interpretation of the cases).
26. See genemly Scott A. Altman, The Pursuit of Intzmacy and Parental Rights, in
THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 305, 306 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012)
("Parental rights are acknowledged, if at all, as derivative-usually as legal entitlements
created to protect children's interests ... or as bribes necessary to induce parents to care for
children."); Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the
Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REv. 305, 329-42 (2010) (arguing that the state is obligated to define
parentage according to the best interests of children). But see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
"Who Owns the Child?" Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Pmpety, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 995 (1992) (presenting a historical analysis that challenges family law's claim to
prioritize children's interests); id. at 1001 ("Stamped on the reverse side of the coinage of
family privacy and parental rights are the child's voicelessness, objectification, and isolation
from the community.").
27. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting) (describing the mother's efforts
to prevent Lehr from establishing a parental relationship, including concealing her
whereabouts, rejecting offers of financial assistance, and threatening to have Lehr arrested if
he tried to visit).
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with Jonathan Lehr.28 Despite his other efforts, Lehr failed to do the
one thing that would have gained him at least some rights under state
law: send a postcard to the state's "putative father" registry, asserting
his paternity.29 By highlighting this technical failure, the Court lent
support to the position that a father's rights turn not on the existence
or nonexistence of a relationship with the child but on whether he is at
fault for the lack of relationship.30 If he did all that he could to by to
form a relationship, perhaps he can claim parental rights even if he
failed. Lebr thus provides some support for the second, more
expansive interpretation of genetic fathers' rights. In this view, the
genetic relationship by itself creates a substantive entitlement to the
child.
This second, broader reading of Lehr, which creates a genetic
entitlement for fathers, should be rejected in favor of protecting
actual, established relationships. Moreover, the mother's actual,
established relationship at the time of birth should also be protected,
meaning that the state should not impose an additional parent (genetic
father or otherwise) without her consent.
While this Article argues against genetic entitlement primarily
on feminist policy grounds, it is worth noting that the better reading of
Lehr points in the same direction. The state law regime upheld in
Lebr did not create a genetic entitlement to parental rights even for
fathers who were completely without fault, even fault of the technical,
procedural kind. Sending a postcard to the putative father registry
would not have guaranteed full parental rights for Jonathan Lehr.
Instead, he would have been entitled only to be heard at the hearing on
whether the adoption was in the child's best interests." By approving
28. See Meyer, supra note 24, at 764-65 (noting passages in which the Court's
language emphasizes fault).
29. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-51 (majority opinion). It is possible that rather than
overlooking the putative father registry, Lehr intentionally failed to register, perhaps to avoid
child support obligations. That motive, however, seems inconsistent with his other efforts to
obtain legal paternity.
30. See id at 264 ("[Ilf qualification for notice [of adoption] were beyond the control
of an interested putative father, [New York's adoption laws] might be thought procedurally
inadequate. Yet, as all of the New York courts that reviewed this matter observed, the right
to receive notice was completely within [Lehr's] control.").
31. Id. at 251 n.5 (quoting N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney (2016)).
Elizabeth Buchanan writes that this statutory scheme "reflected a common assumption about
Stanley," in that it assumed that allunwed fathers had the right to full procedural protections,
even if they did not have an established, custodial relationship, but also that the claims of all
unwed fathers could be evaluated under the best interests standard, rather than parental
fitness. Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitudonal Rftts of Unwed Fathers Before and After
4 8 2 [Vol. 91:473
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this regime, the Court allowed the genetic father's rights to be
significantly weaker than full parental rights." The first, narrower
interpretation of Lehr is thus the better reading of the case because it
applies to full-blown parental rights: they do not attach until the father
establishes a relationship with the child." Before that point, the
genetic father has an "inchoate interest" in his possible relationship
with the child; that interest is entitled to the protections of procedural
due process, but it does not appear to qualify as a "fundamental right"
comparable to full-blown parental rights.34 Accordingly, for the
remainder of this Article, I will refer to the "Lahrregime" as a regime
in which a genetic father has a right to fair procedures that would
allow him to prove biology-plus-relationship but in which he has no
automatic, genetic entitlement to access to the child.
To recap, the Lehrregime, as I have interpreted it, is as follows:
Full-blown parental ights. An unwed, genetic father has full-
blown parental rights to his child if and only if he has met the
biology-plus-relationship test by establishing a caretaking
relationship with the child. (How much caretaking is required to
establish this relationship is unknown.)
Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OMo ST. L.J. 313, 330 (1984). To the contrary, Buchanan points out
"[i]t was his custody of the children, not his biological connection alone, that gave him a
constitutional interest, but that interest was of the same stature as that of any other custodial
parent." Id. The best interests interpretation of Lebr is supported by Justice Stevens's
opinion in Mchael H v. Gerdd D., in which he reasoned that the rights of the "adulterous"
father (in the plurality's phrasing) were adequately protected by the opportunity for a best
interests hearing on the question of visitation. 491 U.S. 110, 135 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Note, however, that when an unmarried father meets the biology-plus-
relationship test, the appropriate standard under Stanley is unfitness, not best interests.
32. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68 ("If one parent has an established custodial relationship
with the child and the [o]ther parent has ... never established a relationship, the Equal
Protection Clause does not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal
rights."). Note that this statement is limited to circumstances in which the child has an
existing legal parent with an established relationship. If the child is otherwise parentless, the
Stanley rule, imposing an unfitness standard, should usually apply even to a genetic father
who has not yet met the biology-plus-relationship test.
33. See also Mark Strasser, The Often Illusory Pmtecdons of "Biology Plus:" On the
Supreme Cowt's Parental Rights Jurisprudence, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 31, 32 (2007)
("[T]he best understanding of the current jurisprudence is that the constitutional protections
[for genetic fathers' rights] are much less robust than currently thought.").
34. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265. If Jonathan Lehr did have a fundamental right in his
potential relationship with his biological daughter, the state's regulations for invoking that
right should have been subjected to at least some form of heightened scrutiny. See Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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The inchoate interest. A genetic father who has not met the
standard for full-blown parental rights has an inchoate interest in
his possible relationship with the child." If he has made this
interest known to the state, he may be entitled to notice of
proceedings that affect the child's status and an opportunity to be
heard on the child's best interests. This hearing is also his chance
to present evidence that he has met the biology-plus-relationship
test.
A final, important issue was left not only unresolved but
virtually unaddressed in the Supreme Court's unwed father cases, and
it has been similarly ignored in the state-level adjudication that has
followed in their wake: If a state chooses to give the genetic father's
claim more protection than the Constitution requires, how far can it
go before it has impermissibly infringed on the mother's rights? The
mother's claim to the child is established, with full constitutional
protection, at the time of birth." In Gary Spitko's apt words, she is the
"initial constitutional parent."" According to the later decision in
Troxel v Granvile, the state may not lightly overrule the child-rearing
decisions of a fit parent; the parent's views must receive special
weight." It follows that awarding full parental rights to a genetic
father may unconstitutionally invade the mother's preexisting rights.
For example, the Supreme Court held that Jonathan Lehr did not have
constitutionally protected parental rights to his genetic child. But
suppose that the state law had given him parental rights anyway.
Doing so would have entailed overriding the mother's parental rights,
which were themselves constitutionally protected.
My interpretation of the Lebr regime gives substantially less
weight than does current practice to the father's interest in his genetic
offspring. While genetic connection is meaningful and important to
many people," it has been given too much weight in the law, at the
expense of concrete caretaking relationships. As discussed below,
courts not only have ignored the problem of the mother's rights but in
35. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265.
36. See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, supra note 1, at 443-44.
37. Spitko, supma note 5, at 99.
38. Id at 68 ("special weight").
39. See generally June Carbone, The Legal Definidon of Palenthood: Uncertainty at
the Core of Fanly Identity, 65 LA. L. REv. 1295, 1335-37 (2005) (discussing a child's
interest in genetic forebears and arguing that "knowledge of genetic heritage is likely to play
a role in shaping identity").
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some states have imposed a duty on the mother to give the genetic
father access to the child for the purpose of meeting the relationship
requirement and acquiring parental rights.40 Part III argues that such
overrides of the mother's rights are subject to heightened scrutiny, and
Part IV considers whether they can survive that scrutiny.
B. States'Responses
The biology-plus-relationship test had barely crystallized as
precedent before it began to erode in the states. Two larger shifts in
family formation put particular pressure on biology-plus-relationship
as a definition of parenthood: (1) the popular and legal embrace of
DNA technology as a prism for understanding both personal identity
and family connections, a development I refer to as genetic
essentialism,4' and (2) an adoption crunch: decreasing supply,
increasing demand, and a growing private adoption industry. These
developments contributed to two opposing trends in states' responses
to the unwed father decisions. On the one hand, the rise of genetic
essentialism strengthened the perceived entitlements of fathers who
have genetic but no other ties to their children.42 On the other hand,
when those fathers have low socioeconomic status and the children
are sought for adoption, powerful forces push for effective means of
cutting off fathers' rights.43 These two forces, which push the law in
opposite directions, have resulted in a patchwork of state approaches
to the rights of unwed fathers, setting the stage for jurisdictional
clashes when a woman becomes pregnant in one state but travels to
another state to give birth and place the child for adoption. However,
all of the states give more substantive rights to genetic fathers than
40. See hfm text accompanying notes 148-152.
41. This phrase refers to a phenomenon distinct from what is usually called "genetic
determinism," meaning the belief that a person's fixed-at-birth genetic makeup determines
important aspects of a person's fate. The related ideology of genetic essentialism is the belief
that genetic makeup constitutes a person's true essence and thus that genetic connections are
the most important determinants of family relationship. Cf Bender, supm note 3. ("Genetic
essentialism asserts that our genes and our DNA are the essence, the core, the most important
constituent part of who we are as human beings; therefore genetics should overpower any
other factor when defining biological parenthood. Genetic essentialism reduces human
beings to the contents of our cells. It ignores the ways our cells and environments interrelate,
the ways our physiological system functions as a whole organism, and the ways our minds
and hearts affect our being. Additionally, genetic essentialism renders all our ways of
nurturing and being nurtured by one another for naught.").
42. See m'fm subpart II.B. 1.
43. See infm subpart II.B.2.
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Supreme Court precedent requires. They do so at the expense of
mothers' parental rights.
1. Genetic Essentialism and the Expansion of Fathers' Rights
The Supreme Court barely had refashioned the law of parentage
to accommodate men's unique biology when the possible routes to
biological and social parenthood themselves began to multiply. The
Supreme Court's articulation of the biology-plus-relationship test
overlapped with the beginnings of the reproductive technology
industry in the United States: the first "test tube baby," conceived
through in vitro fertilization, was born in 1978, just five years before
Lehr.44 The expansion of reproductive technology facilitated the
commodification of each part of the reproductive process, including
genes. Rather than diminishing the importance of genetic parenthood,
however, commodification has been accompanied by an emphasis on
genes as the essence of parenthood.45 I refer to this conception of
parenthood as genetic essentialism.46
The increasing cultural commitment to genetic essentialism may
explain why every state gives more rights to genetic fathers than the
44. Walter Sullivan, First 'Test-Tube'Baby Born h US., Joining Successes Around
Wori N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1981, at Cl.
45. See Hendricks, Essendally aMother, suple note 1, at 475-76. There is a seeming
contradiction between social and legal acceptance of the commodification of gametes and
judicial reliance on gametes as the default definition of parenthood. If your gametes define
your parental status, why can you buy and sell them when you cannot buy or sell your child?
One possibility is that the fact that gametes can be sold enhances rather than detracts from
their perceived importance. Because they can be sold they can be owned, and our culture is
highly respectful of people's rights concerning things they own. For example, in Peny-
Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), a fertility clinic had
mistakenly implanted an embryo made from the Perry-Rogers's gametes into Donna Fasano,
resulting in a pregnancy. In the ensuing custody fight, the court indicated that the fact that
the genetic parents didnot sell their gametes to Donna Fasano would cut against any custody
claim by Fasano. Id at 24. The gametes were transferred to Fasano's body, but somehow
they remained the property of the Perry-Rogers's and had to be returned, even in their new
form. This view of the process is also reflected in the language of surrogacy brokers, who
speak of the surrogate as "giv[ing] the baby 'back' to the [genetic] father, as if it came from
him in the first place." ROTMAN, supla note 4, at 34-41. Ownership of gametes translates
into ownership of the resulting child.
As Katharine Baker points out, even the unwed father cases, despite their emphasis on
relationships, relied on genes as an alternative to marriage for giving men a path to
parenthood. See Katharine K. Baker, Legirnate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L.
REv. 1647, 1649 (2015).
46. See supla note 41 (defining genetic essentialism).
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Supreme Court has required.47  All the Supreme Court has clearly
demanded is that fathers be recognized as legal parents if they have
established caretaking bonds with their genetic children. While all
states must (in theory) honor parental rights in those cases, no state
limits fathers' rights to only this scenario.
First, all states recognize some form of the marital presumption
in which a husband receives automatic parental rights to his wife's
child.48  The only way the wife can prevent operation of the
presumption is to prove genetic nonpaternity.49 In effect, marriage to
the child's mother automatically satisfies the "relationship" prong of
the biology-plus-relationship test, regardless of the nature or even the
existence of a relationship with the child."o
Second, outside of marriage, the mother can consent to the
father's Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity, which has effects
similar to the marital presumption." If the mother does not consent,
however, all states allow a man to petition to establish paternity and
will grant the petition under most circumstances so long as genetic
fatherhood is shown.52 States also routinely impose legal paternity
47. Strasser, supm note 33, at 32, 59-75 (arguing that "constitutional protections [for
unwed fathers] are much less robust than currently thought" and canvassing states' laws).
48. LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 865
(5th ed. 2014) ("In all states a child bom to a married woman is at least rebuttably presumed
to be the child of her husband."). For example, the Uniform Parentage Act provides that a
man is presumed to be the father of a child born during or within 300 days after his marriage
to the mother. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs of Unif. State
Laws 2002).
49. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 631(1) ("The paternity of a child having a presumed,
acknowledged, or adjudicated father may be disproved only by admissible results of genetic
testing excluding that man as the father of the child or identifying another man as the father
of the child."). An exception is in Pennsylvania, where rebutting the marital presumption is
even more difficult, requiring a showing of impotency, sterility, or nonaccess. Vargo v.
Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
50. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (indicating that the mother's
husband is presumed to satisfy the biology-plus-relationship test).
51. See hfm notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
52. See ANN M. HARALAMBIE, 1 HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION
CASES § 3:7 n.27, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015) (collecting citations to state laws
on the legal effect of genetic confirmation of paternity). The exception under the Uniform
Parentage Act is that the genetic claim must be brought within the first two years after the
birth and may be subject to a best interests determination if the child already has a presumed
father. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 606-08. Thus, again, the mother's only defense to a
genetic father's claim is usually not her own parental rights, but those of an alternative father.
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based solely on genetics, either at the behest of the mother or even on
the state's own initiative over the mother's objection."
Third, in the adoption context, many states give a known genetic
father a veto over adoption regardless of whether he has a relationship
with the child so long as he complies with various procedural
requirements.54 In states that require something more than a genetic
tie to assert this veto right, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on
financial support rather than on a caretaking relationship."
Ordinarily, there is nothing wrong with states protecting rights
more broadly than the federal Constitution requires. In doing so,
however, they are not supposed to sacrifice other constitutionally
protected rights." Here, the other rights in question are the mother's
parental rights.
53. States frequently initiate paternity actions in order to seek reimbursement from
the father of welfare benefits paid for the benefit of the child. The mother is required to assist
with these efforts as a condition of receiving the benefits. See generally Deborah Harris,
Child Support for Welfaw Families: Famly Policy Trapped in Its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 619 (1987-1988) (arguing that the child support enforcement system
is "fundamentally flawed"); Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Childen:
Subordnatig the Best Intersts of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1029, 1043 (2007) (describing the welfare cost recovery system and arguing
that it has a negative impact on family relationships and no significant benefit to the
government).
54. See Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Rights of Unwed Father To Obstruct
Adoption ofHis Child by Withholding Consent, 61 A.L.R.5th 151 (1998). This Annotation
classifies cases based on the reason that the state relies on for denying the father's right to
veto the adoption. For example, section 5 of the Annotation collects cases in which the state
questioned the father's "degree of commitment." In these cases, commitment is
overwhelmingly measured by legal filings and offers of financial support, rather than
physical care of the child. Similarly, section 11 collects cases in which the mother allegedly
interfered with the father's efforts to see the child or provide financial support, but the
outcomes turn on the failure to meet formal, procedural deadlines rather than on an inquiry
into the existence or nonexistence of a relationship with the child.
55. For example, Utah is regarded as among the states most hostile to unwed fathers'
rights. See Brooke Adams, Uth Dad Alleges 'Deceit,' Takes Fight for Son to Federal Court
SALT LAKE TRiB. (Dec. 31, 2013, 6:11 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/printfriendly.php?
id=57332833&itype=cmsid (reporting claims of forum shopping by birth mothers and
adoption lawyers). However, for infants under six months old, Utah law does not require any
proof of a relationship with the child; in order to establish parental rights, an unmarried
biological father must merely file an affidavit pledging financial support. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-6-121 (West 2016). While fathers have difficulty complying with the procedural
requirement that the affidavit be filed before the mother relinquishes the child for adoption,
the substance of the statute ignores the parent-child relationship in favor of the pocketbook
definition of fatherhood. See also Campbell, supra note 54 (summarizing cases collected in
A.L.R. Annotation).
56. See generally PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding
that allowing appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression was not
infringement of appellant's property rights); Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality
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State courts, however, have failed even to recognize that the
mother has rights at stake, much less protect those rights. In one of
the leading cases, Adoption of Kelsey S., the California Supreme
Court faced the question of whether the father's rights depend on the
mother's willingness to give him access to the child." As discussed
above, the holding of Lebr strongly suggests that they do, but the
Court's insistence on blaming Jonathan Lehr for his one procedural
misstep obscured the issue." Given this leeway, California took a
different view, arguing that it would be "improper to make the father's
rights contingent on the mother's wishes."" In this view, even in the
context of infant adoption, a man's inchoate interest in his genetic
child not only is protected from state interference but also grants him
a legal entitlement against the child's mother. In effect, California
held that a genetic father has automatic parental rights at the birth of a
child, which he loses only if he abandons the child by willfully failing
to establish a relationship. Under this approach, parental rights
protect a form of genetic ownership rather than an existing
relationship.
While all states have committed to genetic essentialism to some
extent in their substantive law, not all states enforce this genetic
entitlement to the same degree in the context of adoption. As
discussed in the next subpart, proadoption policies compete with
genetic essentialism and sometimes prevail in limiting the rights of
genetic fathers." Outside the adoption context, however, all states are
willing to base legal paternity on genes alone, even if the unwed
and Entrenchment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 393, 445-48 (2012) (describing the Supreme Court's
"benevolent neutrality" approach to the Religion Clauses, which allows "play in the joints"
for states to create extra protections against the establishment of religion without necessarily
violating the Free Exercise Clause or to give extra protection for the exercise of religion
without necessarily violating the Establishment Clause). Although in both situations,
expansions of the constitutional rights on one side do not necessarily violate the rights on the
other side, the effect and potential diminishment must be considered.
57. Steven A. v. Rickie M. (Adoption of Kelsey S.), 823 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Cal.
1992). In Adoption of Kelsey S., the genetic father tried to block his infant son's adoption.
Under California's statutory scheme, an adoption could proceed on the mother's consent
alone if the child lacked a "presumed father." Because acquiring presumed-father status
required receiving the child into one's home-and the genetic father had not done so-the
prospective adoptive parents argued that the adoption should proceed.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 15-30. See generally Meyer, supra note 24
(discussing the dilemma of the "faultless father" and the Supreme Court's failure to resolve
that dilemma).
59. Adoption ofKelseyS., 823 P.2dat 1229.
60. See mfm subpart II.B.2.
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mother objects." Thus, while the unwed father cases could have
established caretaking as the touchstone for parental rights, this
approach largely failed to withstand the cultural commitment to
genetic essentialism as the basis for abstract entitlements to children.
States are not testing the boundaries of genetic fathers' rights, at least
not by enforcing the relationship requirement. No state has made a
relationship with the child a prerequisite for paternal rights. Instead,
state courts assume that the father's inchoate interest in the child can
legitimately overcome the mother's full-blown parental rights."
The courts with the strongest commitment to men's genetic
rights have also insisted that the only remedy for an adoption that
violates the genetic father's constitutional rights or any additional
statutory entitlements is to undo the adoption and place the child in
the custody of the father." This remedial strategy has resulted in
public spectacles in which young children bear the traumatic costs of
rulings that are almost certainly not compelled by the Constitution.'
The children are treated as objects whose ownership by the competing
adults is decided without reference to the children's interests or rights.
The last several decades have seen the commodification of
reproduction and the rise of genetic essentialism. Both of these
developments are marshaled in support of claims that mothers and
fathers should have the same parental rights, even immediately after
birth because they are biologically equal genetic parents." In
adhering to this view, the states have rejected the opportunity, offered
by the unwed father cases, to protect concrete relationships rather than
the abstract claims of genetics.
61. As discussed below, a married mother has a better chance of success if she
objects to sharing parental rights with a genetic father who is not her husband.
62. See hfia text accompanying notes 148-152 (discussing courts' treatment of
mothers' efforts to prevent genetic fathers from establishing relationships with children).
63. See, e.g., In ze Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994) (ordering the removal of child
from adoptive family because of improper termination of the genetic father's rights and
holding that the best interests of the child were irrelevant to the decision); DeBoer v. Schmidt
(In rv Baby Girl Clausen), 502 N.w.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
64. See Meyer, supra note 24, at 753 (describing, in heartbreaking detail, the removal
of four-year-old "Baby Richard" from his adoptive family).
65. But see infr text accompanying notes 101-103 (discussing the fact that mothers
make a greater biological contribution to the child, not only through gestation but also
through a greater genetic contribution).
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2. The Denigration of Low-Income Fathers and the Quest for
Adoptable Infants
During the same period, however, an opposing trend has also
emerged. Some state legislatures have cut back on the rights of
genetic fathers, even pushing up against Lehis boundaries in some
respects." At least part of this pushback is attributable to the growth
of the adoption industry and the relative scarcity of the healthy infants
most sought by adoptive parents. To facilitate those adoptions,
legislatures typically retain their ideological commitment to genetic
parenthood in the substantive law but impose burdensome procedures
that allow state courts, like the Supreme Court in Lehr, to blame
unwed fathers themselves for losing their genetic entitlements by
failing to follow the rules."
Most of the Supreme Court's unwed father cases involved
adoption, but the proposed adoptions in those cases were by the
mothers' new husbands." The consequences of a mistake regarding
the genetic father's rights were therefore relatively minor. In Lehr, for
example, the most likely consequence of reversal in the Supreme
Court was that Lehr would have obtained visitation. Although the
stepfather would have lost his status as a legal parent, the mother
would still have had hers; practically speaking, the stepfather would
have continued playing a role in the child's life. In contrast, undoing a
third-party adoption is far more disruptive. In an adoption by legal
strangers who will raise the child in place of the birth mother, the
appearance of a genetic father after the fact is likely to result in
heartache for all concerned.69 This prospect puts pressure on the
66. Laura Oren, Unmarnied Fathem and Adoption: "Perfecting" or 'Abandoning" an
OpportunityInterest, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 253, 269-70 (2007) (noting states that passed stricter
laws in response to high-profile adoption disruptions). In contrast, some of the highest
profile subsequent cases in state courts have featured the birth mother and genetic father, on
the same side, trying to undo a third-party adoption. See Strasser, supra note 33, at 58-75
(summarizing states' implementation of the unwed father cases); infra text accompanying
notes 230-234.
67. See infra note 74 (discussing the role of state procedural requirements).
68. The exception is Stanley, in which the father sought custody of the children after
the mother died. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
69. Controversy exists over whether these disruptions cause substantial long-term
harm to the children's development or happiness. Compare In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 186
(111. 1994) (McMorrow, J., concurring) ("No one would disagree with the view that children,
especially those of tender years, should not be bantered about between biological and foster
or adoptive parents. Delay damages the child, regardless of who is eventually awarded
custody of the child. The parents, adoptive and biological, also suffer greatly and
unnecessarily."), with id at 368 (Heiple, J., denying rehearing) ("As for the child, age three,
49 120 17]
492 TULANE LA WRE VIEW [Vol. 91:473
system-from adopting parents and from agencies that serve them-
to terminate the rights of genetic fathers efficiently and permanently.
That pressure is intensified by the low number of infants
available for adoption. The Supreme Court began its revision of the
rights of unwed fathers in 1972, just a year before Roe v Wade
provided more women with abortion as an alternative to adoption."
The contraceptive pill was widely available, and the stigma of
unmarried motherhood declined rapidly, leading more women to
conclude an accidental pregnancy with a child to rear rather than a
child for adoption." Despite misplaced rhetoric about the nobility of
"saving" a child through adoption,72 there is no question that adoption
is a "seller's market." The rights of genetic fathers can be a substantial
obstacle to maintaining supply in that market.
it is to be expected that there would be an initial shock, even a longing for a time in the
absence of the persons whom he had viewed as parents. This trauma will be overcome,
however, as it is every day across this land by children who suddenly find their parents
separated by divorce or lost to them through death. It will not be an insurmountable trauma
for a three-year-old child to be returned, at last, to his natural parents who want to raise him
as their own. It will work itself out in the fullness of time."). It is certainly plausible that
most children are resilient enough to thrive in a loving home after a reversed adoption;
certainly, children often do well after much worse. However, short-term effects also matter.
To consider only long-term effects is to treat children as important only for the sake of the
adults they will become, disregarding their experience now in a way that we do not when,
say, calculating damages for an adult's emotional distress.
70. Compare Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658, with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166-67
(1973).
71. George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, An Analysis of Out-of- Wedlock Births M
the United States, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 1, 1996), www.brookings.edu/research/papers/
1996/08/childrenfamilies-akerlof ("Before 1970, the stigma of unwed motherhood was so
great that few women were willing to bear children outside of marriage.... Before the
1970s, unmarried mothers kept few of their babies. Today they put only a few up for
adoption because the stigma of unwed motherhood has declined.").
72. Eg., Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection
Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 889, 925, 927 n.142 (2011)
("That adoption is not presently a compelling alternative for many women speaks far more to
the ease with which liberal abortion laws enable women to dispense of their unborn children,
thus enabling societal forces on the whole to neglect needed reforms to adoption laws,
practices, and attitudes."); Lynn D. Wardle & Travis Robertson, Adoption: Upside Down and
Sideways? Some Causes of and Remedies for Declinng Domestic and International
Adoptions, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 209, 210 (2013) ("There are few government-regulated
transactions that morally compare with the selfless, charitable, and compassionate act of
responsible adults taking parentless children from foreign countries into their homes."). The
Christian right promotes adoption as preferable not only to abortion but also to an unmarried
woman keeping her child. See Kathryn Joyce, Shotgun Adoption, NATION (Aug. 26, 2009),
https://www.thenation.com/article/shotgun-adoption (describing "a pattern and history of
coercing women to relinquish their children").
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For the most part, the measures that states use to overcome this
obstacle work not by changing the underlying assumption of genetic
entitlement; interestingly, even those who most seek to cut the father
out of the process of newborn adoption do not question that he has
rights to the child by virtue of genetics alone. Instead, they impose
procedural requirements on a man's attempts to assert those rights;
Lehr's misstep about the postcard is a case in point. Other devices
include short deadlines, constructive notice, and other legal
technicalities unlikely to be fully understood or complied with by any
but the most sophisticated or well-represented fathers.74 The Uniform
Parentage Act, for example, requires a man to register with the
putative father registry within thirty days of the child's birth." In this
way, a substantive commitment to genetic entitlement can coexist with
the imperative to sideline fathers in newborn adoptions: the
substantive law enshrines genetic entitlement while arcane and
burdensome procedures make it unlikely that young and/or low-
income men will be able to claim that entitlement.
The cultural commitment to genetic essentialism entails viewing
gametes, and thus children, as giving rise to an abstract entitlement
that is weakly, if at all, grounded in caretaking relationships. This
orientation pushes courts to recognize substantive entitlements for
genetic fathers. On the other hand, valorization of adoption and the
denigration of low-income fathers (and mothers) pushes legislatures
to cut off fathers' rights efficiently in order to facilitate adoption.
Broadly speaking, the states have reconciled these two impulses by
adopting genetic entitlement - as substantive law but creating
73. See supa note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Lear v. Robetson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983)).
74. See Campbell, supra note 54, §§ 5-13 (collecting cases in which courts
determined whether genetic fathers had complied with statutory requirements to entitle them
to veto adoptions); see also Kevin Noble Maillard, A Father's Struggle To Stop His
Daughter's Adoption, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2015), http://theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/
07/paternity-registry/396044/ (stating that putative father registries "were designed primarily
to protect adoptive couples and the children they bring home" and quoting a lawyer who says
that the registry is "a 'check box' so the adoption can go ahead and get the pesky father out of
the way").
75. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(5) (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs of Unif. State
Laws 2002).
76. These mechanisms exist only to protect the future parental rights of adoptive
parents; there are no similar mechanisms to protect a birth mother's exclusive parental rights
because states do not acknowledge that a single woman can have such rights.
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procedural mechanisms that cut off that entitlement in order to
facilitate adoption.
The details, however, vary greatly by state, setting the stage for
cross-jurisdictional conflicts. Adoption agencies are savvy about
different states' laws and may advise birth mothers and prospective
adopters to ensure that the birth takes place in a state with a narrow
view of the rights of genetic fathers." Agencies and lawyers also
assist in avoiding or flouting the requirements of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), which governs jurisdiction and provides the
substantive law for children who are eligible for tribal membership."
A few of the states with stronger protections for genetic fathers' rights
have begun to push back, indicating their willingness to allow tort
suits against agencies who place children for adoption across state
lines.
Cross-jurisdictional problems have led to some calls for a
national system for determining the rights of genetic fathers, whether
that be in the form of a national putative father registry or a national
standard for the father's claim."o Most of the calls have rested on the
premise that we need stronger protection for fathers' rights." Reform
of the system for establishing fatherhood, however, could also be an
opportunity to reassert he importance of caretaking relationships and
de-emphasize genetic entitlements. Whether state or national, the
system should be founded on a robust theory of sex equality and
parental rights, rather than the superficial equality and stealth
patriarchy of genetic entitlement.
77. See Adams, supm note 55 (describing reports of forum shopping by birth mothers
and adoption lawyers).
78. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012); see Bethany
R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REv. 295, 304-05 (2015).
79. See, eg, Wyatt v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555, 564 (Va. 2012) (recognizing a
common law cause of action for tortious interference with parental rights against individuals,
other than the mother, who facilitated adoption); see John A. Bluth, Can an Unrranied
BiologicalFatherRecoverHis ChildandDamages, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 577, 590-99.
80. See Strasser, supra note 33, at 82-83 (discussing proposals).
81. See, eg., id Adoption proponents also support a national registry. Megan
Lestino & Erin Bayles, NCFA's 2016 Policy Piorities and Adoption-Related Legislation,
ADOPTION ADvoc., Jan. 2016, at 1, 8-9 (detailing the NCFA's support for a "National
Responsible Fatherhood Registry").
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III. THE COST OF GENETIC ENTITLEMENT
"Stealth patriarchy?" Yes. Genetic essentialism masquerades as
an ideology of sex equality in parenting. It does so by defining
parenthood in male terms and acknowledging mothers as equal
parents because, and only because, they meet the male-centered
definition.8 2 The historical antecedents of genetic essentialism were
more explicit doctrines of male supremacy in reproduction, the echo
of which appears in genetic essentialism's discounting of gestation.
Genetic essentialism is the modem mask of a long-extant patriarchal
ideology of reproduction.
For that reason, feminists should reject claims that sex equality
requires a genetic definition of parenthood. As discussed in subpart
III.A, the biology-plus-relationship test already accommodates men's
unique biology to a greater extent than women have received any
accommodation in the name of sex equality. The test therefore
satisfies not only the anemic formal equality norm that governs most
equal protection jurisprudence but also the substantive equality norms
often championed by feminists.
Genetic essentialism is nonetheless attractive to many feminists
for its superficial sex parity and for its policy potential. In recent
years, feminist legal scholarship has taken a turn toward masculinities
and the problems of men." Although novel in its centering of
masculinity, this scholarly turn is consistent with the history of sex
equality litigation in the Supreme Court. Feminist litigators-most
notably Ruth Bader Ginsburg-recognized early on that sexism could
be perpetuated by laws that appeared on the surface to favor women.8
82. See infra text accompanying notes 97-104.
83. See, e.g., NANCY E. DowD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND
PRIVILEGE (2010); Jamie R. Abrams, The Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing
Violence, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703 (2010); Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law,
and Pemsonal Life: Towards a New Fmrnework for Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431 (2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and
Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619 (2013); Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper,
Identities Cubed: Perspectives on Multidnensional Masculnities Theory, 13 NEV. L.J. 326
(2013); Camille Gear Rich, Angela Harris and the Racial Politics of Masculinity Trayon
Martin, George Zinmerman, and the Dilemmas ofDesiring Witeness, 102 CALF. L. REV.
1027 (2014).
84. See Mary E. Becker, Obscunng the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social
Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
264, 275 (1989) [hereinafter Becker, Obscuring the Struggle] ("Equal protection doctrine
tends to regard discrimination against women and men as parallel (and equally troubling)
events.... Like women, men may be constrained by stereotypes and social pressures.
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In light of the role that ideologies of motherhood and fatherhood play
in maintaining sex-based subordination, feminists are properly
concerned with interrogating how the law treats fathers, and they are
rightly troubled by legal regimes that discourage men from caring for
children. In addition, many feminist family law scholars are rightly
troubled by disproportionate regulation of low-income families,
including the legal system's enthusiasm for removing children from
poor families and placing them for adoption. To both of these
problems, a regime of stronger legal rights for fathers sometimes
appears as a possible remedy.
Feminists should be cautious, however, about invoking a
patriarchal theory of parenthood in the service of feminist causes.
Subpart III.B proposes a framework for evaluating the use of genetic
entitlement to serve feminist ends. The key component of the
framework is that it incorporates the cost of giving genetic
entitlements to fathers. When state laws go beyond Lebr and Stanley
v Illinois" to protect genetic fathers' inchoate interests in children,
they do so at the expense of mothers' established and fully
constitutionally protected parental rights. The social interest in
promoting male caretaking or protecting vulnerable families must be
weighed against the infringement of women's parental rights.
A. Sex Equality (Expansively Considered)
First consider the question of what sex equality means in the
context of conferring legal parenthood based on biological
parenthood. The biology-plus-relationship test is manifestly
consistent with even an expansive analysis under the formal,
anticlassification approach that dominates equal protection doctrine."
Indeed, the test was designed to go beyond the requirements of formal
equality and provide substantive equality for a man whose
relationship with his genetic child approximated the caretaking
Nevertheless, men tend to come out on top, which is not at all the same as being constrained
and coming out on the bottom.").
85. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (protecting the parental rights of an unwed father who had
an established relationship with his children).
86. See Robin West, Toward an Abohtionist Interpnetation of the Fourteenth
Amendment 94 W. VA. L. REv. 111, 111-14 (1991) (describing the schism between the
anticlassification (or "formalist") theory of equal protection and the antisubordination
theory); see also Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1605, 1612
(2015) (describing the anticlassification theory as the dominant doctrinal approach).
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invested by a gestational mother." Proponents of the rights of genetic
fathers suggest, however, that the Lehr rule subordinates men to
women, perhaps even amounting to a form of "male coverture,"
thereby invoking equal protection's other face, the antisubordination
principle." This subpart discusses each of these doctrinal issues in
turn.
1. Does Formal or Substantive Equality Require Genetic
Entitlement?
No. As a matter of formal sex equality, a genetic tie alone need
not confer parental rights." As the Supreme Court has held, the man
with a merely genetic tie is not similarly situated to the woman who
has given birth. He therefore need not be treated the same."
Of course, the reason that question is so easy to answer is that
the Supreme Court's sex equality jurisprudence is famously narrow,
crabbed, and literal-minded in implementing the principle that like
things be treated alike. Biological sex differences-usually construed
as women's problematic deviations from the norm7-more often
justify sex classifications than trigger scrutiny of them.9
2 At a
minimum, any purported sex classification that can be rephrased in
formally sex-neutral terms-for example, "a 'parent' is a person who
87. See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, supra note 1.
88. See infa text accompanying notes 113-130 (discussing the argument that the
situation of unmarried men with respect to reproduction is analogous to coverture).
89. But see Mary E. Becker, The Rights of Unwed Paents: Feminist Appmaches, 63
Soc. SERv. REv. 496, 501-03 (1989) [hereinafter Becker, The Rights of Unwed Parents]
(arguing that formal equality can be manipulated to support either outcome).
90. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 259-60 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 392 (1979).
91. See, e.g., Robert W. McGee, Gender and the Ethics of Tax Evasion: An
Empirical Study of 82 Countries (April 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/
abstract-2424893 ("What makes women different from men? How are they different from
men? Is female thinking becoming closer to male thinking as women gain equal rights and
liberation?"). Note that in addition to serving as the norm, male thinking is assumed to be
stable over time, unresponsive to social changes in gender relations.
92. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding male-only draft
registration); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding
statutory rape law that criminalized sex with an underage girl, but not sex with an underage
boy); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding the exclusion of women from
certain jobs in prison); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding an employee
benefits program that excluded disability coverage for pregnancy while covering almost all
other medical conditions). See generally Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences,
and the Supreme Cour, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983) (identifying the "real differences" cases in
which the Supreme Court perceived sex differences to arise from biology); Sylvia A. Law,
Rethnkng Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984) (same).
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gestates and gives birth to a child"-should survive equal protection
review."
As I have previously pointed out, however, the Supreme Court
adopted a more expansive approach to equal protection in the unwed
father cases-conspicuously, the one area of law in which sex
differences tend to accrue to women's advantage.94  Through the
biology-plus-relationship test, the Supreme Court has already
accommodated men's biological limitations in producing children-
i.e., their "difference"-creating the sort of accommodation that
female plaintiffs have asked for but never received in a sex
discrimination case." In Lebrand its predecessors, the Court went out
of its way to create a test for constitutional parenthood "in terms the
male can fulfill."" The Lehr regime therefore satisfies not only the
demands of formal equality (treating like things alike) but also those
of substantive equality (giving comparable treatment to things that are
comparable, even if not the same).
Some courts and scholars disagree, arguing that formal equality
requires "equal rights" at birth for mothers and fathers, defined to be
such by genetics without regard for the existence of a personal
relationship with the child." This argument implicitly adopts the
purely genetic definition of parenthood, deeming mothers and fathers
alike because they make equal genetic contributions to the child. It
93. Cf Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20 (reasoning that a distinction between
"pregnant women and nonpregnant persons" was not a sex classification under the Equal
Protection Clause). If "pregnant person" is a gender-neutral category, then so is "gestational
parent." Moreover, reports of Geduld's death have been greatly exaggerated. Compaw
Reva B. Siegel, You've Come A Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's NewAppmoach toPzgnancy
Discnmination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1871, 1891-97 (2006) (arguing that IMbs
requires Gedulg to be construed much more narrowly than it has traditionally been
understood), with Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Ovenides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 511, 551-56
(2009) (arguing that Geduldg and its statutory companion case, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012), influence interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
bolstering judicial resistance to Congress's intent).
94. Hendricks, Essentially aMother, supra note 1.
95. Id at 441-44.
96. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (describing Congress's effort to allow
male citizens to transmit citizenship to their foreign-bom children).
97. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Male Covertume. Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56
RUTGERS L. REv. 73 (2003); Michael J. Higdon, Marginalized Fathers and Demonized
Mothers: A Feminist Look at the Reproductive Firedom of Unmarried Men, 66 Ala. L. Rev.
507, 532-34 (2015) (arguing that the situation of unmarried men with respect to reproduction
is analogous to coverture); see also Becker, The Rights of Unwed Parns, supra note 89
(arguing that formal equality could be interpreted this way).
49 8 [Vol. 91:473
FA THERS AND FEMINISM
treats gestation and birth as irrelevant, except to the extent that
gestation is evidence of genetic parenthood."
Gestation is characteristically female,99 and for that reason alone,
feminists should be suspicious of arguments that discount it.
Gestation is also, prima facie, a more substantial connection to a child
than genetic makeup, and it has a far longer history as a basis for legal
parenthood. In the vast majority of cases, the mother has gestated the
child in addition to being one of the genetic parents. As Barbara Katz
Rothman and others have demonstrated, disregarding gestation in the
definition of parenthood is, literally, patriarchal; it is the "law of the
father."0
Moreover, even assuming that the essence of parenthood entails
the biological transmission of heritable traits, the claim that the
mother's genetic parenthood is equal to the father's is factually
incorrect. The woman who contributes the egg passes more DNA to
the child than does the man who contributes the sperm because eggs
contain both nuclear and mitochondrial DNA, while sperm contain
only nuclear DNA.o'0 In addition, heritable traits are transmitted not
only by passing DNA through eggs and sperm but also by epigenetic
changes to gene expression that occur during gestation (and after birth
as a result of interactions with the environment).'02 Finally, the
process of gestation also creates a two-way biological connection, not
just one-way transmission, since cells pass between fetuses and their
gestational mothers in both directions.10' Gestation itself thus
98. See ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 36-37 ("Women do not gain their rights to their
children [under patriarchy] as mothers, but as father equivalents, as equivalent sources of
seed." (emphasis omitted)).
99. On the connections between sex, gender, and reproductive behavior, see supra
note 1.
100. ROTHMAN, supma note 4, at 34-41.
101. See W. Nicholson Price II, Note, Am IMy Son? Hunan Clones and the Modem
Family, 11 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REv. 119, 142-43 (2010) (discussing mitochondrial DNA
and the common, incorrect belief that DNA exists only in the nucleus).
102. See Hendricks, Not of Woman Bom, supra note 1, at 424 n.95.
103. See Gavin S. Dawe et al., Cell Migntion from Baby to Mother, 1 CELL
ADHESION & MIGRATION 19 (2007) ("Fetomatemal transfer probably occurs in all
pregnancies and in humans the fetal cells can persist for decades. .. Fetomaternal
microchimerism may have important implications for the immune status of women,
influencing autoimmunity and tolerance to transplants."); Nancy Shute, Beyond Bifth: A
Child's Cells May Help or Harm the Mother Long ARer Delivey, SCI. AMER. (Apr. 30,
2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fetal-cells-microchimerism/ ("Mother and
child are engaged in a silent chemical conversation throughout pregnancy, with bits of
genetic material and cells passing not only from mother to child but also from child to
mother. Scientists increasingly think these silent signals from the fetus may influence a
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intensifies the mother's greater genetic and biological relationship
with the child.
I would not hang the legal definition of parenthood on the
difference between nuclear and mitochondrial DNA. My point is that
when proponents of parental "equality" at the time of birth seek to
justify their position by reference to the science of DNA, they can do
so only by systematically discounting not just gestation but any
scientific information in support of the otherwise mundane
observation that birth mothers make greater contributions to the
creation of a child than do genetic fathers. The frequent rhetorical
invocation of purported genetic equality between mothers and fathers
is rooted in an ideology that is as impervious to fact as was the
historical insistence on paternal superiority that has only recently and
grudgingly given way" The claim of equality between genetic
fathers and gestational mothers at the time of birth is based on a male-
centered definition of parenthood that is primarily ideological, only
incidentally and selectively incorporating genetic science.
At the time of birth, genetic fathers are not similarly situated to
gestational mothers. Formal equality therefore does not require that
they be treated the same. Moreover, substantive equality has already
been achieved by the biology-plus-relationship test, which allows
genetic parents to acquire equal rights with gestational parents
through means expressly tailored to men's biological limitations.
Equality principles do not require paternal rights beyond those
conferred by that test.
mother's risk of cancer, rheumatoid arthritis and other diseases, even decades after she has
given birth."). This phenomenon is the reason that scientists have been able to develop tests
that use a blood draw from the mother, rather than amniocentisis, to diagnosis fetal genetic
anomalies. See Jane E. Brody, Breakthmughs in Plenatal Screening, N.Y. TIMES: WELL
(Oct. 7, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/breakthroughs-in-
prenatal-screening ("[A]t around 10 weeks of gestation, about 10 to 12 percent of the DNA in
a woman's blood will be fetal DNA from the placenta."). Conceivably, development of a
fetus may also be affected by the presence, at the time of conception, of seminal fluid from a
man other than the genetic father. See Angela J. Crean et al., Semnal Fluid and Mate
Choice: NewPredictions, 31 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EvoLunoN 253 (2016).
104. See ROTHMAN, supm note 4, at 36 ("When forced to acknowledge that a
woman's genetic contribution is equal to a man's, Western patriarchy was in trouble. But the
central concept of patriarchy, the importance of the seed, was retained by extending the
concept to women." (emphasis omitted)); Hendricks, Not of Woman Bom, supra note 1, at
418-26 (tracing the patriarchal ideology of reproduction from Aristotle to nineteenth-century
preformationism to modem genetic essentialism).
5 00 [Vol. 91:473
FATHERS AND FEMINISM
2. Do Antisubordination Principles Require Genetic Entitlement?
Equal protection analysis is more than just a technical exercise in
analyzing classifications, levels of scrutiny, and state interests; there
remains a need to identify at least some element of class-based
oppression in order to make a strong case that the principle of equality
has been violated."' That is, the anticlassification theory and the
antisubordination theory of equal protection continue to coexist.
Moreover, despite the narrowness of existing doctrine, a feminist case
can be made that the doctrine should be more expansive and should
prohibit subordinating legal rules even if they satisfy both formal
equality and some fact-specific version of substantive equality. Thus,
this section discusses the question, posed by a few scholars, of
whether the refusal to give men a genetic entitlement to their
biological children wrongly subordinates men to women-whether it
constitutes an unjust distribution of power.
Arguably, this question is not even a properly framed question in
equal protection jurisprudence. The antisubordination theory of the
Equal Protection Clause requires attention to historical context and
lived reality; it does not ask whether particular doctrines prioritize one
group or another in the abstract or in a particular decision.' The
correct question is not "Does this law disfavor Group X in this
particular decision?" but "Does this law contribute to the overall
subordination of Group X in society?" The claim that men are
subordinated to women in society overall is not plausible, which
arguably ought to end any equal protection argument on this basis.10
105. For example, in the litigation over same-sex marriage that ultimately led to
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), courts largely ignored or rejected the argument
that bans on same-sex marriage were sex classifications that triggered heightened scrutiny on
that basis, despite the fact that the bans quite clearly classified on the basis of sex. This
failure was likely because the courts failed to see the connection between the marriage bans
and the subordination of women. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against
Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrinination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994); Andrew
Koppelman, Why the Sex Discrimnation Argument Failed in Califorma, BALKINIZATION
(May 23, 2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/05/why-sex-discrimination-argument-
failed.html.
106. See West, suprd note 86, at 112-13 (describing the antisubordination approach).
107. See Becker, Obscuring the Struggle, supm note 84, at 275 ("Sex discrimination
subordinates women to men on a systemic basis in our society, but not vice versa."). One
could also ask whether Lehr subordinates women to men by reinforcing stereotypes about
gender roles in parenting. Subpart [V.A discusses this possibility by asking whether genetic
fathers' rights should be expanded in order to combat those entrenched roles.
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In addition, when one group has historically subordinated
another, it is easy to confuse the loss of unjustly held power with
"reverse discrimination." Indeed, many of the grievances articulated
in the discourse about men's parental rights are readily identifiable as
resentment about the loss of male power over women. This theme is
most apparent in the literature of the self-described "men's rights
movement," which is explicitly misogynist."o' Even mainstream
writing, however, uses rhetoric that connotes gendered anxiety about
men's loss of power. For example, one scholarly argument for genetic
entitlement to children is titled Systematically Screwing Dads."' In
this construction, men who "lose" custody of children they have never
met are "screw[ed]"-metaphorically fucked as if they were
women."o A similar sense of sexual anxiety is conveyed by an article
offering practice tips for lawyers in Alabama. The article is titled The
Putative Father Registry: Behold Now the Behemoth, and it opens
with this quotation:
Look at the behemoth.
What strength he has in his loins,
What power in the muscles of his belly!
Under the lotus plant he lies,
Hidden among the reeds in the marsh."'
Here, the putative father registry itself is personified as a virile male
who lies in wait threatening to cut off the genetic father's .. . well, let's
just say his rights."2
108. See Kelly Alison Behre, Digging Beneath the Equality Language: The Influence
of the Fathers' Rights Movement on Intimate Partner Violence Public Policy Debates and
FamilyLawRefonn, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 525, 542-43 (2015) (reporting that the
Southern Poverty Law Center has classified several fathers' rights groups as misogynistic
hate groups); Bethany M. Coston & Michael Kimmel, White Men as the New Victzms:
Reverse Discrination Cases and the Men's Rights Movement, 13 NEv. L.J. 368, 373
(2013) ("[T]he Men's Rights movement has become a movement of re-appropriating power
at all costs.").
109. Jeffrey A. Parness, Systematically Screwing Dads: Out of Control Paternity
Schemes, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 641 (2008).
110. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 4,4
n.2 (1989) (stating that feminism analyzes the "relations ... in which some fuck and others
get fucked" and arguing that "[t]he lack of an active verb meaning 'to act sexually' that
envisions a woman's action is a linguistic expression of the realities of male dominance").
111. Shirley D. Howell, The Putative Father Registry: Behold Now the Behemoth, 64
ALA. LAW. 237 (2003) (quoting Job40:15, 16, 21).
112. See, eg., Mary A. Totz, Comment, What's Good for the Goose Is Good for the
Gander: Toward Recognition ofMen's Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 142
(1994) (analogizing a wife having an abortion to Lorena Bobbit cutting off her husband's
penis with a kitchen knife). Note that the title of this piece suggests a retributive tit for tat in
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These framings of men's grievances do not connote the loss of
an emotional tie with a loved child. They connote anxiety about the
diminishment of masculine power. They thus belie the claim that the
Lebr regime-which not only satisfies the demands of formal
equality but goes further, affirmatively accommodating men's
biological disadvantage-violates an equality norm.
While the resonance of fathers' rights claims with explicitly
antifeminist agendas is reason for caution, separate lines of argument
may support expanding paternal rights from a feminist perspective.
At least two feminist scholars, Martha Davis and Michael Higdon,
have argued that the current rules for establishing fatherhood are a
form of coverture, analogous to the legal nonpersonhood of married
women at common law."' Their work expresses two kinds of feminist
concern for fathers' rights.
First, feminists worry that the narrow scope for fathers' rights at
birth is a reflection of gender stereotypes."4 A woman, after giving
birth, is automatically a legal mother; if fatherhood remains optional
or even nonautomatic, the implication is that children are women's
responsibility."' Many feminists fear that the legal system not only
reflects that stereotype but further entrenches it by discouraging or
even preventing men from engaging in caretaking."' In subpart IVA,
I discuss this concern and argue that giving men greater legal power
vis-t-vis their female intimate partners is not the optimal feminist
response to this fear.
which women should be made to share what they have wrongly hoarded from men, or live by
rules from which they have been inexplicably exempt.
113. Davis, suple note 97; Higdon, supra note 97, at 532-34.
114. See Higdon, supra note 97, at 535-38.
115. See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteeis and Draftes: The Struggle for Parental
Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991) (expressing this interpretation of the law).
116. This concern arises in a larger context of feminist concern about the rise of
neomatemalism, referring to a cultural and political phenomenon that "invokes an image of
women [as mothers] who seek to extend their domestic concerns into the public realm."
Naomi Mezey & Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Against he NewMatemalism, 18 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 229, 243 (2012); see also Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood's
Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REv. 465 (2016) (arguing that intent-based definitions of parenthood
would promote greater parity not only with respect to gender but also with respect to class,
sexual orientation, and marital status); Dara E. Purvis, The O~rgi ofParentalRights: Labor,
Intent, andFathes, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 645, 688-92 (2014) (discussing feminist concerns




Second, Higdon argues that parentage law is an instance of
"governance feminism" in the sense criticized by Janet Halley.17
Briefly stated, the relevant aspect of the critique is that feminism has
won some of its legal battles, gained power in the legal establishment,
and in due course abused that power at times."' This critique overlaps
somewhat with intersectional concerns that feminist power may be
used, in particular, to the detriment of men who have relatively less
social power, due to identity characteristics, feminist-inspired legal
rules, or other factors."'
The historical development of parentage laws raises some doubt
that Halley's narrative of governance feminism applies to the law as it
now exists. The cases in point for the governance feminism critique
are the fields of law in which feminism has united with the forces of
the carceral state (rape and domestic violence)'20 or the sex panic of
puritanical institutions (Title IX enforcement).2' In contrast, the
unwed father cases remain a backwater of legal doctrine and have not
been prominent on any feminist law reform agenda.'22 This is not
plainly a field in which feminists have gained enough power to be at
risk of abusing it or of having feminist reforms co-opted in the service
of other agendas.'23 The law of unwed fathers' rights has not been a
117. Higdon, supra note 97, at 531-38 (discussing JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS:
How AND WHY To TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006)).
118. See HALLEY, supra note 117, at 20-22 ("If you look around the United States,
Canada, the European Union, the human rights establishment, even the World Bank, you see
plenty of places where feminism, far from operating from underground, is running things.").
119. See Angela P. Harris, Race andEssentialism inFeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 581, 599-601 (1990) ("[F]or black people, male and female, 'rape' signified the
terrorism of black men by white men, aided and abetted .. . by white women.").
120. See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Cuime, 84 WASH. L. REv. 581
(2009); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Cime, 92 IOWA L. REv. 741 (2007).
12 1. Janet Halley, Tradig the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title 1I Enforement, 128
HARv. L. REv. FORUM 103 (2015).
122. There is no identifiable feminist movement focused on protecting women's
parental rights in the way that there are legal and political movements to combat domestic
violence and sexual assault. "Today, the unwed father cases are a mere footnote to the story
of the constitutional equality revolution." Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)
Mamage and Parental Rights in the Age ofEquahty, 125 YALE L.J. 2292 (2016). Feminists
did not participate significantly in the early unwed father litigation (in part because of
dissension within the ACLU over how the cases would affect women), and "[t]he Court's
discussions bore the ideological imprint of the divorced fathers' rights and traditional family
values movements more than of feminism." Id at 2338-40, 2378-81.
123. This is not to say that rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment, and sexual
assault are not serious problems in need of continuing feminist intervention. It is possible for
all three of the following statements to be true simultaneously: feminists sometimes abuse
5 04 [Vol. 91:473
FA THERS AND FEMINISM
target of feminist reform and exists largely in its unreconstructed,
prefeminist state. To the extent that feminist ideals have influenced
the current regime, it has been in the direction of expanding fathers'
rights: sex equality principles are what led the Supreme Court to insist
that unmarried parents who both care for their children are equally
situated regardless of sex.'24 Similar (though, I would argue,
misguided) equality principles have influenced states to go even
further, in the direction of genetic entitlement.'25 To the extent that the
current system arguably favors women over men, that bias is more
likely attributable to old-fashioned gender norms than to feminist
reforms.
My argument here, however, is more vulnerable to the
governance feminism critique. I support a narrow version of the Lehr
regime, as I have described it, which would be a substantial
contraction of fathers' rights when compared to the genetic
entitlement that has taken hold in the states over the last fifty years. It
is a strong claim of female prerogative over reproduction. In addition,
because marriage is increasingly concentrated in the upper classes,
any contractions of unwed fathers' rights under Lebr will generally
fall on low-income men.126
I might offer the rejoinder that the question here is the allocation
of power between mothers and fathers, such that any loss experienced
by low-income men is a gain to low-income women. This is partly
true. But as Bethany Berger has compellingly argued, current limits
on fathers' rights are part of a system of rules that denigrate low-
income fathers andmothers, largely but not exclusively in favor of the
interests of adoptive parents.'27 My deeper response, set out in subpart
IVB, is that expanding fathers' rights is not the best solution to this
problem. After all, low-income men are often denied the patriarchal
privilege of genetic entitlement by means of procedural and financial
power; feminism is sometimes co-opted; and old-fashioned, rape-and-pillage sexism still
exists.
124. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979).
125. See Steven A. v. Rickie M. (Adoption of Kelsey S.), 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992);
see also supm subpart II.B.1 (discussing states' commitment to genetic entitlement).
126. The regime discussed here is applicable primarily to unmarried parents; for
married couples, the law generally presumes that the mother's husband is the father, and he
acquires rights at birth. Marriage thus continues to serve as the approved legal mechanism
for connecting men to children. The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that the
biology-plus-relationship may apply to all fathers; married fathers are simply presumed to
have satisfied it. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,256 (1978).
127. Berger, supra note 78, at 343-50.
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barriers; strong substantive rights hardly matter if those rights can
rarely be exercised.128 Instead, the law could protect birth mothers
from genetic claims to the same extent hat some states now protect
adoptive parents, and it could do much more to eliminate undue
pressure on birth mothers to place their children for adoption.12
Ultimately, my argument here is that any proposal for expansive
fathers' rights must reckon with the cost of that expansion, which is a
decrease in mothers' rights. That cost may in some circumstances be
worth paying, but it should not be ignored, least of all by feminists.
In Halley's terms, then, this Article is feminist in that it posits an
n/fdivide, opposes a legal regime that sets m>1 and carries a brief
for P00 The brief, in this case, is that a false, superficial theory of
equality in parenthood is serving to obscure the sacrifice of
gestational mothers' rights in the service of other goals, both feminist
and otherwise. As discussed in the next section, that sacrifice must be
justified, just like any other sacrifice of individual rights for the
advancement of social interests.
B. Accounting for the Cost of Genetic Entitlement
A woman who has just given birth has full-blown parental rights
protected by the Constitution. Moreover, unless and until the genetic
father meets the biology-plus-relationship test,"' she is the only
person who has such rights regarding that child. If the state seeks to
grant custodial or other parental rights to another person, against her
will, it must justify its disregard for her parental decision under
constitutional standards. In this respect, she stands in the same
position as the single mother whose rights the Supreme Court upheld
in Troxel v Granville, the Court's most recent foray into the scope of
128. Indeed, many proposals that seek to strengthen fathers' rights focus on procedural
bars. See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 33 (proposing a national registry and DNA tracking, as
well as expanded substantive rights).
129. See, eg., Maya Manian, Minot, Parents, andMinorParents, 81 Mo. L. REv. 127
(2016) (arguing that the laws of abortion and adoption, as applied to pregnant minors,
function to punish girls' sexuality and enforce a traditional gender script); Elizabeth J.
Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Govermng Mothers' Consents to the Adoption of Their
Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REv. 509 (2005); Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant
Minors' Consent in Aborion andAdoption, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 99 (2013).
130. See HALLEY, suple note 117, at 17-20 (setting out a definition of feminism that
culminates in "[c]arrying a [b]rief for f').
131. Recall that the biology-plus-relationship test is effectively satisfied if the parents
are married. See Quilloh, 434 U.S. at 256.
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parental rights.3 2 Troxeltherefore provides the appropriate framework
for evaluating state laws that give genetic entitlements to fathers who
have not met the biology-plus-relationship test.
Jenifer and Gary Troxel had a son named Brad. Brad married
and had two daughters. When he separated from his wife, Tommie,
he moved in with his parents, so Jenifer and Gary saw their two
granddaughters frequently during weekend visitation. Two years after
the separation, Brad committed suicide. At first, Tommie kept
bringing the girls to see the Troxels frequently, but eventually she told
them she was going to cut back to monthly visits, apparently because
she was marrying a man who also had children from a prior marriage
and she wanted the girls to spend more time with the new family.'33
The Troxels sued for a visitation order. They asked for two
weekends per month and two weeks in the summer. Tommie offered
one day a month. The judge thought it was good for the kids to spend
time with their grandparents, that the girls would benefit from seeing
their cousins more, and that they should have access to some
unspecified musical opportunities at the Troxels' house. Applying the
"best interests" standard, he ordered one weekend a month, one week
in the summer, plus the grandparents' birthdays.134
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down that order, holding that the
judge had gone too far in second-guessing Tommie's decisions.' The
views of the parent, said the Court, must receive "special weight" in a
dispute over custodial arrangements.36 Although the trial court had
applied the familiar "best interest of the child" standard, that standard
properly applies only in disputes between adults who each have equal
claim to the child (such as custody disputes between legal parents)."
A stronger constraint applies when the government intervenes in an
existing family over the objection of the parent, even when it
intervenes on behalf of the grandparents."' The state cannot overrule
the parent based solely on a disagreement about the child's best
132. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
133. Id. at 60-61.
134. Id. at 61.
135. That majority consisted of a four-justice plurality, with Justices Souter and
Thomas concurring in the judgment.
136. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
137. Idat69.
138. Id. at 69-70.
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interests. It must, under Troxel, give special weight to the parent's
decisions about her family.'"
A postpartum woman and her infant are an existing family, and
an unmarried woman who has just given birth is in a position similar
to Tommie Granville's. She has fully protected parental rights, which
she shares with no one. She is, in Gary Spitko's phrasing, "the initial
constitutional parent."'40 The genetic father, on the other hand, is
similar in some ways to a grandparent: He is a person the law
recognizes as special with respect to the child, but he does not yet
have constitutionally protected parental rights.4 ' His access to the
child is subject to the discretion of the existing legal parent. If the
state wishes to override that discretion, it can do so only after
overcoming the special weight owed to the parent's decision.'42
139. Id.
140. Spitko, supra note 5, at 99.
141. One difference is that the father's special status comes from the Constitution
while the grandparent's is conferred by statute, so that grandparents do not have the same
procedural rights, for example, to be notified before a newborn adoption. (There need not be
a putative grandparent registry.)
Other people may also stand in this liminal space of being special with respect to the
child and potentially eligible for full or partial parental rights. See, eg., LaShanda Taylor
Adams, (Re-)Grasping the Opportunity Interest Lehr v. Robertson and the Tenninated
Parent, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31 (2015) (arguing that a parent whose rights have been
terminated should be able to reestablish parental rights via the Lehrregime, when the child is
still in foster care). Also, the law may well shift toward unbundling parental rights in ways
that would allow for recognition of multiple degrees of relationship. See, e.g., Pamela
Laufer-Ukeles, The Relational Rights of Children, 48 CoNN. L. REv. 741, 795-806 (2016)
(proposing a three-tier system of formal primary parents, functional parents and secondary
custodians, and tertiary kin relations, each with their own set of rights and responsibilities).
See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv.
879 (1984) (arguing for legal recognition of familial relationships that children develop with
caretakers outside the nuclear family); James B. Boskey, The Swamps of Home: A
Reconstruction of the Parnt-Child Relationship, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 805 (1995) (proposing
an unbundled system of rights); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional
Right of Childrn To Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV.
358 (1994) (discussing de facto parent-child relationships from a children's rights
perspective).
142. The principle that the child can acquire an additional constitutional parent only
with the cooperation of the existing parent is well-established in de facto parent doctrine,
which recognizes that adding a parent necessarily compromises the rights of existing parents
and therefore requires their cooperation. See generally William C. Duncan, The Legal
Fiction of De Facto Parenthood 36 J. LEGIS. 263, 264 (2010) (describing the rule that de
facto parenthood requires consent of existing parents); Emily B. Gelmann, What About
Susan? Thre's Company, Not A Crowd: The Inportance of Allowing Third Pawnt
Adoptions When Both Legal Parents Consent, 30 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'y 57, 62 (2015)
(describing the current legal status of de facto parenthood); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Limiting
the Prerogatives of Legal Parents: Judicial Skepticism of the American Law Institute's
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When a birth mother objects to a genetic father's request to
establish parental rights, rather than give her objection this special
weight, many courts turn the tables and treat the objecting mother as
an unjust obstacle to the father's rights.'43 They take a fill-in-the-
blanks approach to parentage,'" which contemplates a child's birth
certificate as having two blank spaces, one for "mother" and one for
"father," which can be filled independently of each other. For
example, in a case involving a dispute over a surrogacy contract, the
California Supreme Court asserted that recognizing any rights in the
surrogate would unfairly "diminish" the other woman's role as
mother.'45 This focus is telling. At no point did the court express
concern that the surrogate's claim could diminish the father's status;
only the mother was seen as affected. Similarly, in several of the
unwed father cases, the Supreme Court perceived a contest between
two potential fathers-the genetic father and the stepfather-rather
than, more properly, one between the genetic father and the birth
mother.'46 Courts have since become more accustomed to same-
gender pairs of parents, but they still seem to think of parents as
coming in pairs. Even though Troxel itself protected the rights of a
Treatment ofDe Facto Pamnts, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw. 477 (2013) (noting judicial
skepticism towards ALI recommendations); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trustmg Mothers: A
Cntique ofthe American LawInstitute's Treatment ofDe Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1103 (2010) (criticizing the ALI's recommendations for de facto parenthood for lack of
deference to mothers). Similarly, a birth mother's consent should be a precondition to
anyone else, including the genetic father, acquiring rights to the child. Her consent is
required both because she is the person charged with making decisions for and about the
child and because legal recognition of another parent will diminish her ability to do so.
143. See infd text accompanying notes 148-152.
144. Cf Fiona Kelly, Autonomous Motherhood and the Law: Exploring the
Naratives of Canada's Single Mothers by Choice, 28 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 63, 73 (2012)
("Adding a 'father' to [a single mother by choice] family is not understood as an intrusion
because the family is perceived as having an inherent 'gap': the lack of a second parent.");
Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents By the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 11 (2008) ("Family
law, as part of the larger prevailing culture, has enshrined the number two.") (focusing on
whether children could have more than two legal parents).
145. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (Cal. 1993) ("To recognize parental
rights in a third party with whom the Calvert family has had little contact since shortly after
the child's birth would diminish Crispina's role as mother."). But see Kristine Renee H. v.
Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005)
("The court's comment, however, was based on its belief that interjecting a third party would
upset the child's stable, intact, and nurturing home. The Johnson court did not foreclose the
possibility, in an appropriate case, of finding two parents of the same sex where only two
parties are attempting to establish legal parentage.").
146. SeeMayeri, supa note 122, at 2300-01, 2371.
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single parent, courts rarely note any inherent problem with forcing a
genetic father into a mother and child's life.1 47
Because of this preference for parents to come in twos, courts
have largely been blind to the inherent diminishment of the unmarried
mother's rights that is entailed in granting parental rights to the
genetic father over her objection. When courts treat the child of a
single mother as inherently in need of a second parent regardless of
the mother's consent, they elevate the biological father's genetic
connection to the child to such a degree that the diminishment of the
mother's existing constitutional rights is not merely accepted but
unacknowledged and unseen.
Far from respecting the decisions of the child's only
constitutional parent, many courts are harshly critical of women who
decline to share their pregnancies and children with genetic fathers.
When Mary Burbach and Mary Ann Lamanna analyzed how courts
talk about unwed mothers and fathers' rights, the most common
theme they identified was "Lie/Deception" by the mother.'48 The
second most common theme was "Rejected/Thwarted," referring to
the mother's rejection of the father's efforts to establish a relationship
with the child.149 Burbach and Lamanna summarized the rhetoric of
the opinions they studied as follows:
The [Lie/Deception] cases all have something in common:
explicit or implicit criticism of a biological mother's lying or other
deception. While in these cases the biological fathers' lack of initial
interaction with or interest in their children is legally significant, blame
is often placed on the biological mother as well. The perception or
reality that she had lied or deceived is addressed in these opinions, and
it is not condoned.'
147. Indeed, outcomes like Lehr can be explained by the fact that Robertson was not
merely trying to exclude Lehr from the child's life but was offering a stepfather in his place.
In that sense, commenters are correct to observe that the biology-plus-relationship test may
serve as a mask for a traditional marriage-oriented theory of parenthood, even if traditional
gender roles are not explicitly part of the test. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEmAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAlvULY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 85
(1995) [hereinafter FINEmAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER]; cf Hendricks, Essentially a Mother,
supra note 1, at 445-50 (arguing that the biology-plus-relationship test can and should be
interpreted to promote sex equality, not traditional roles within marriage).
148. Mary Burbach & Mary Ann Lamanna, The Moral Mother: Motherhood
Discourse in Biological Father and Third Party Cases, 2 J.L. & FAm. STUD. 153, 164 (2000).
149. Id at 164, 171. The third most common was "Mother's Legal Status," which
refers to a court's mentioning the fact that the mother's legal rights are established by the
birth.
150. Id. at 171.
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Similarly, in one of the Rejected/Thwarted cases, the court wrote
that requiring a relationship with the child before awarding rights to
the father would "make an unwed father's right to withhold his
consent to adoption dependent upon the whim of the unwed
mother.""' As Burbach and Lamanna note, "It appears that the
justices in this case find the unwed mother who rejects an unwed
father just as objectionable as an unwed father who does not do his
utmost to fulfill his parental duties."52
In their criticisms of deceptive or rejecting mothers, courts fail to
examine their implicit assumption that the pregnant woman owes a
duty to her former lover with regard to her pregnancy. Where could
such a duty come from? Any claim of parental rights-even inchoate
ones-is necessarily premised on the Fourteenth Amendment, or
possibly the First.'5  But either amendment constrains only the state.
Nothing in the Constitution compels a fit, constitutionally protected
parent to give anyone else access to her child.'54 As the Idaho
Supreme Court, seemingly alone among the states, has recognized:
The fleeting opportunity may pass ungrasped through no fault of
the unwed father or perhaps due to the interference of some private
third party; nevertheless, once passed the unwed father is left without
an interest cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. No violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment lies unless "state action," not merely the
actions of private persons, thwarts the unwed father's "grasp."'
151. Burbach & Lamanna, supra note 148, at 172 (quoting Abernathy v. Baby Boy,
437 S.E.2d 25, 29 (S.C. 1993)). This passage is reminiscent of Justice White's dissent in Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting), in which he objected to allowing
abortion at "the convenience, whim, or caprice of the pregnant woman." The two passages
share their readiness to assume that women make major life decisions about their families on
the basis of irrational whim.
152. Burbach & Lamanna, supm note 148, at 172.
153. Although state law defines parenthood as an initial matter, after the Lehr line of
cases, the boundaries of that definition are matters of federal constitutional law under both
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
154. While other sources of law can give rise to additional duties, the very question
here is whether the law may impose duties on the holder of a constitutional right that infringe
on that right. Interestingly, there is a similar pattern in the context of abortion, in which those
who disagree with public law outcomes (the legality of abortion and the relationships
requirement as a firm prerequisite to parental rights) turn to private law, in an effort to
establish a duty in tort that would reverse the public law outcome (by limiting access to
abortion or by holding the mother liable for failing to provide access to the child). See Maya
Manian, Privatdrng Bans on Abortion: Eviscemthg Constitutional Rights Th ugh Tort
Remedies, 80 TEMP. L. REv. 123 (2007).
155. Steve B.D. v. Swan (In e Steve B.D.), 730 P.2d 942, 945 (Idaho 1986) (citations
omitted) (citing Buchanan, supm note 31).
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The Idaho court's opinion correctly applied the state action rule
to hold that a birth mother, exercising her constitutionally protected
parental rights, cannot conceivably violate any Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the genetic father. The father acquires similar
rights only if he establishes a relationship with the child and doing so
will ordinarily require the consent of the existing legal parent."'
In the absence of that consent, Troxel establishes that the state
needs a stronger reason than its own view of best interests to interfere
with the parent's decisions. The Troxel framework should extend to
cover an unwed father's desire to establish a relationship with his
genetic child. If the child's mother objects, the state may overrule her
objection only in accordance with Troxdi, by giving at least special
weight to her view.
Of course, adopting the Troxelframework does not predetermine
any outcomes, especially since Troxel itself suggested that special
weight may turn out to be a lenient standard for state intervention.'
A few current practices, however, are clearly inconsistent with the
birth mother's Troxel rights. A court should not give automatic
parental rights to the father based solely on a genetic entitlement. In
addition, a court should not award parental rights to the father based
solely on the court's own determination of the child's best interests.
As in Troxel, the existing legal parent is charged with determining the
child's best interests, and her determination is entitled to, at least,
special weight; on some readings of Troxel, her determination can
only be abrogated on a showing of harm to the child. A detailed
articulation of the Troxel standard is beyond the scope of this Article;
I argue only for something more than the current rule, which is that
the mother's objection to the genetic claim counts for nothing."'
156. The importance of the mother's consent to the child's acquisition of a new parent
also explains why fathers may acquire parental rights through the marital presumption or
through a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity, even before they have established a
relationship with the child. As Gary Spitko has explained, marriage is at least evidence of the
mother's consent to coparent. Spitko, supra note 5, at 114. Similarly, a Voluntary
Acknowledgement of Patemtiy signed at the time of birth requires the mother's consent.
157. See Emily Buss, A dif in the Middle: Parental Rights AflerTroxel v. Granville,
2000 SUP. CT. REv. 279, 279-80 ("The central problem with the Court's decision in Troxelis
not that it affords parents too much protection, as some have argued, or that it affords parents
too little protection, as others have argued, but that it tries to have it both ways.").
158. Also beyond the scope of this Article is a full discussion of the role of genetic
fathers in a legal regime that unbundles parenthood by acknowledging intermediate status
between parent and legal stranger. For example, Pamela Laufer-Ukeles has proposed a three-
tiered regime consisting of formal, primary parents with custodial and other traditional rights
and responsibilities; secondary, functional parents or secondary custodians; and tertiary kin.
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The deference that a Troxel standard would afford a single
mother is similar to the deference that courts already give to married
mothers by way of the marital presumption. When the mother is
married and her husband is willing to claim the child as his own,
courts will sometimes refuse even to consider genetic evidence from
another man; the Supreme Court has upheld this practice even when
the genetic claimant had previously lived with and cared for the
child."' This disparity-an unmarried woman who objects to a man's
genetic claims is characterized as fickle and deceitful, while a married
couple who closes ranks against the wife's lover receives the law's
protection-reveals that the current system's commitment is to the
patriarchal family rather than to protection of parent-child
relationships.
Application of the Troxel standard would better protect existing
parent-child relationships, but my discussion so far has assumed that
the standard would be applied case by case. Yet many scholars,
courts, and legislators believe that two parents are better than one,
and/or that children ought to have male parents involved in their lives,
and/or that genetic relationships are extremely important.'60 Thus,
lawmakers may be inclined to find that it is always harmful to a child
to lack a relationship with her genetic father, even giving special
weight to the mother's contrary view. They may therefore seek to
make across-the-board eterminations that would effectively reinstate
genetic entitlement. In particular, many feminists argue for increased
rights for genetic fathers in the service of feminist goals. My
argument so far does not necessarily foreclose that possibility. This
Article does not aim to establish that fathers should never receive
legal recognition based on genes but to point out that there is a cost-
paid in the currency of women's autonomy and their right to make
decisions for their children-when the law gives an automatic genetic
entitlement to men. In Part IV I explore how that cost should be
reckoned when set against the feminist goals of involving men in
child-rearing and protecting poor families from exploitation.
Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 141, at 797-806. The discussion in the text assumes, without
endorsing, that a genetic father claiming parental rights must be awarded either full parental
status or nothing. See supra text accompanying note 141.
159. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
160. See sources cited supm note 144.
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IV. FATHERS' RIGHTS AND FEMINIST AGENDAS
The remainder of this Article considers how feminist concerns
about men and masculinity intersect with rules for fathers' rights. It
assumes the framework described above: (1) If the genetic father has
not met the biology-plus-relationship test, the gestational mother is
the constitutional parent. (2) Under Troxel, the state should not be
able to force her to share custody or accept another legal parent,
including the genetic father, absent some heightened showing of the
state's need or the child's welfare.6' Setting aside how the child's
interests might be evaluated case by case, this Part focuses on other
state interests that feminists might wish to advance by giving men
parental rights across the board on the basis of genetics alone.
Subpart IVA discusses the possibility that we should strengthen
men's parentage rights, even at the expense of women's autonomy, in
order to promote equality in child-rearing. Subpart IVB discusses the
use of fathers' rights as a tool to protect low-income fathers and
mothers from pressure to relinquish children for adoption. In both
cases, I argue that there are other, better means to achieve feminist
goals.
A. StalledRevoludon: Should Men Have Rights To Encourage
Them To Nurture?
Family law scholars generally agree that men should be
encouraged to participate in childcare more than they do. Increased
male caretaking, it is thought, would promote sex equality as well as
provide better, more stable environments for the children
themselves.'62 I agree with both goals and agree that they would be
161. This discussion avoids the term "compelling state interest" and other formalities
of substantive due process doctrine because that doctrinal structure is at best in flux and more
likely defunct. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Schmidinger's Child Non-Identty and
Probabilides hi Reproductive Decision-Making, 69 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'y 221, 229-31
(2016) (describing in detail the Supreme Court's departure from the traditional substantive
due process framework, especially in reproductive and family law cases, beginning with
Planned Pawnthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and ending
with Troxel v. Grnville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); the trend has since continued with Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)).
162. Clare Huntington, Postrnalital Family Law: A Legal Stuctue for Nonmarital
Families, 67 STAN. L. REv. 167, 168 (2015) ("[T]he state should help unmarried parents
become effective co-parents, especially after their relationship ends, so they can provide
children with the healthy relationships crucial to child development."); Laurie S. Kohn,
Engaging Men as Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income
Families, 35 CARDozo L. REv. 511 (2013) (arguing that the legal system inadvertently
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served by more male caretaking, but I question whether overriding the
mother's parental rights in the name of encouraging fatherhood is an
effective strategy or worth the cost."'
1. Feminist Concern for Fathers' Rights
The recent feminist turn to men and masculinity" has been
needed and important for two reasons. First, if a goal of feminism is
to expose and dismantle gender-based systems of power, then at some
point it needed to examine the other side of gender. Second, the
antiessentialist critique of feminist theory contained within it the need
to consider men. For example, Angela Harris's landmark critique of
dominance and difference feminism pointed out that most feminist
work to reform rape law came from a white perspective that assumed
an otherwise unproblematic relationship with law enforcement."
exacerbates father absence and proposing reforms to encourage greater involvement);
Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood Encougin7g Divorced Fathers To
Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 921 (2005). See genedlly Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1472
(arguing that the law should adopt fifty-fifty parenting as its expressive ideal); Davis, supra
note 97, at 76 (arguing that the law should recognize "fathers' potentials as caregivers and
parents" by eliminating sex distinctions in parentage law). In arguing for two-parent
families, scholars and policymakers often invoke correlations between number of parents in
the home and various indicia of the child's later success. See, eg., Huntington, supra
(passage quoted). The causal arrows, however, may run in many directions; for example,
poverty may cause both single parent households and difficulties for the child. See
Maldonado, supm, at 949-62 (describing some of the negative outcomes for children often
attributed to the absence of an involved father and analyzing the likelihood of causation as
opposed to mere correlation). Feminist analyses consider not just the quality control issues in
the production of the child but also the burden on the single parent and overall effects on sex
equality. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMIuEs, GOVERNMENT, AND
AMERICA'S POLITICAL IDEALS 104-10 (2010) (arguing for marriage as a support for adult-to-
adult caretaking but also insisting that support for marriage should not divert resources from
nonmarital families that may have greater need); Czapanskiy, supra note 115 (framing
parental contributions to child-rearing as a sex equality issue); Davis, supm note 97, at 75
(arguing that limitations on men's parental rights "legitimize a range of formal policies and
informal practices that link women's reproductive capacities with special parental
responsibilities").
163. For one perspective on the relationship between women's autonomy and the
family structures promoted or tolerated by law, see June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Tiple
System ofFamilyLaw, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1185, 1191-92 ("In the [working class], the
largely invisible fight is one to set the terms for families where women are increasingly the
more reliable breadwinners and homemakers without the ability to lock in understandings
that would reflect their greater assumption of family responsibilities. Development of the
laws in this third system accordingly requires recognition that the critical choice is whether to
accept women's greater authority within the family or accelerate the move away from
committed relationships altogether." (footnotes omitted)).
164. See sources cited suple note 83.
165. Harris, supmnote 119, at 598-601.
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Although the focus of Harris's analysis was that not all women
experience gender in the same way, implicit is the point that not all
men are similarly situated with respect to gender either. The study of
masculinities is thus part of feminism's increasingly ambitious scope,
in which the predominant aim of scholars and activists is to theorize
and fight against interlocking systems of subordination, perhaps even
to the point that feminism as such disappears.' Instead of seeking
universality by ascribing to all women a core, essential experience
of gender, feminism now aspires to universality through
multifacetedness and intersectionality.
One result of the turn to men is the increase in feminist attention
to men as fathers, partly for their own sake and partly in the hope of
restarting the "stalled revolution." This term refers to the observation
that liberal feminism has been more successful in transforming the
workplace than in transforming the home.' The revolution of sex
equality is seen as stuck at a halfway point. Formal equality at work
(though arguably on male terms) is the law of the land and the
accepted norm. Equality at home-in housework, childcare, and
general willingness to sacrifice individual priorities for family ones-
has been more elusive. The inequality at home in turn makes actual
equality at work harder to achieve.
Broadly speaking, feminists have pursued two strategies to try to
restart the liberal feminist revolution. One set of strategies involves
further reform of the workplace: If the workplace rules are more
"family-friendly," then perhaps women will be more able to succeed
despite the inequality at home, and perhaps men will be willing to do
more at home if they are safe from losing out at work; everyone will
"have it all." The second set of strategies target the home directly by
encouraging men to be active fathers.
The feminist case for genetic entitlements is that they are
strategies of the second sort. The idea is that granting automatic
parental rights to genetic fathers has expressive value, letting men
166. See Marc Spindelman, Femiusm Without Femmnism, IssUEs IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, Dec. 2011, at 1.
167. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME 12 (1989) (originating the term "stalled revolution"); see also
Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1415 ("Women's entry into the paid workforce has been aided
by legal changes promoting equal treatment of male and female workers. No equivalent
legal movement has promoted men's entry into the unpaid workforce of the home. In fact,
... family law actively promotes a gendered allocation of household labor." (footnotes
omitted)).
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(and women) know that the law sees fathers as real, legal parents."
This message will encourage men to take the steps necessary to meet
the biology-plus-relationship test, and it will force women to allow
them to do so. It follows, hopefully, that men will establish more
permanent and close relationships with children.
2. Many Ways To Support Fatherhood
Although there are good reasons to encourage men to identify
more strongly as fathers and to support them in fulfilling an
expanded, care-oriented vision of that role, there are also many ways
to provide that encouragement and support. Genetic entitlements
need not necessarily play a role in this effort and may actually impede
it, since they eliminate caretaking from the definition of male
parenthood.
In many cases, at the time of birth, the mother wants the genetic
father to participate in caring for the child. In such a case, a Voluntary
Acknowledgement of Paternity (VAP) allows unmarried parents to
make a documented commitment to coparenting at the time of birth.'
Importantly, the adjective "voluntary" here refers to voluntariness on
the part of both the mother and the father; a man cannot use a VAP to
become a father unless the mother consents.'" The VAP process thus
substitutes for marriage by allowing for the creation of a coparenting
relationship by mutual consent.
168. Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Bith: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood 14 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 925 (2006) ("Presuming fatherhood at birth based on genetic
connection honors the reproductive rights of fathers and reinforces a norm of care, to the
benefit of children."); Jean Strout, Dads and Dicta: The Values of Acknowledging Fathers'
Interests, 21 CARDozo J.L. & GENDER 135, 167 (2014) (arguing for the expressive value of
acknowledging fathers' rights arguments because "men ... have fewer constitutionally
protected reproductive rights than women").
169. See Baker, supra note 45, at 1686 (noting that voluntary acknowledgements are
the second most common way, after the marital presumption, in which a parent besides the
birth mother becomes legally recognized). See generally Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming
Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv.
1295 (discussing the role of voluntary acknowledgements and the continuing judicial
preference for marriage).
170. See 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(4) (2015) ("The State must require that a voluntary
acknowledgment be signed by both parents . . . ."). while this regulation applies only to a
subset of births outside of marriage, it shapes the acknowledgement procedures that states
adopt and then apply to all cases. Of course, if the mother refuses to sign the
acknowledgement, the father can usually establish paternity through other means based on
genetic connection alone. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
5 172017]1
TULANE LA W RE VIEW
In fact, it is safe to say that the determination of legal
coparentage-through marriage or a VAP-is something of a high
point for sex equality in American family policy."' Although the law
increasingly recognizes the need to mediate family and other
responsibilities for all parents, the United States notoriously lags
behind the rest of the industrialized world on this issue. Moreover,
there is still a lot more that could be done outside the workplace. Too
many parenting plans have a mother as a primary caretaker and treat
the father's visitation as his right, but not his obligation.172 The one-
parent doctrine in child welfare law treats fathers as not just irrelevant
but nonexistent."' Slight progress has been made in preserving
incarcerated women's relationships with children, but even less has
been done to preserve relationships in the face of the mass
incarceration of fathers.'74 In light of all that society could be doing to
reshape and support fatherhood in ways that would also support
mothers and children, it is premature to reach for genetic entitlement,
a tool that shifts power from women to men and defines fatherhood in
the narrowest possible terms.
I realize that in a few sentences I have offered, as an alternative
to genetic entitlement for fathers, a sketch of sweeping social reforms,
171. Both methods of establishing parentage are also easily adaptable to same-sex
couples. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitinacy m6 the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REv. 227 (2006); Leslie Joan Harris,
Voluntaty Acknowledgements of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 467 (2012).
172. See Czapanskiy, suplm note 115, at 1442-51 (describing the ways in which a
custody statute enforces visitation rights while saying nothing of visitation duties); Kohn,
supra note 162, at 512 n.5 (collecting cases in which courts refused to require fathers to
exercise visitation rights); Daniel Pollack & Susan Mason, Mandatory Visitation, 42 FAM.
CT. REv. 74, 78-79 (2004) (making a limited case for enforcing visitation as a duty owed to
the child while also showing why the assumptions embedded in the American legal system
make courts reluctant to do so).
173. See infr note 185 and accompanying text.
174. See generally William Wesley Patton, Mommy's Gone, Daddy's h Prison, Now
Wat About Me?: Family Reunification for Childen of Single CustodialFathers in Pison-
Will the Sins of Incareerated Fathers Be Inherited by Their Children?, 75 N.D. L. REv. 179
(1999) (describing prison systems' treatment of single parents, especially fathers); Elise
Zealand, Protecting the Ties that Bind fm Behind Bars: A Call for Equal Opponunities for
Incamerated Fathers and Their Chidren To Maintain the Parent-Child Relationship, 31
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 247 (1998) (arguing that incarcerated fathers are underserved in
the current system and need more opportunities to maintain a parent-child bond). My
criticism here is directed at criminal justice policies that damage parent-child relations; a
danger in addressing the problem is that rather than reforming the penal system, we will use
the family courts to increase the burden on mothers by making them responsible for
maintenance of children's relationships with incarcerated fathers.
5 18 [Vol. 91:473
FA THERS AND FEMINISM
each of which would face immense political barriers. In other words,
I have offered pie in the sky as an alternative to a relatively easy rule
change.'7 1 My point is that the cost of the rule change falls on
mothers, while the cost of more comprehensive efforts to support
families (and fathers) and promote equality falls on society. That
disparity in cost bearing is a hallmark of impermissible infringements
on constitutional rights;"' it is a taking of individual rights for a social
purpose. It must therefore be justified by more than ordinary
expediency.
It is also not clear, moreover, why automatic rights should be
expected to encourage greater involvement by fathers. That is not the
way we usually think of incentives: one does not give the reward first
in the hope that it will somehow induce the desired behavior. In fact,
we have already seen the results when this cart precedes this horse.
The same argument for equal rights for fathers has been the basis for
"equalizing" custody laws to presume joint custody or otherwise
disregard the strength of existing caretaking relationships when
determining child custody. The "result[] is a legal system that
empower[ed] fathers" by giving them extra leverage in divorce
litigation."' Women who have been primary caretakers and may thus
be deeply attached to their children are told that this connection
counts for nothing, putting them in a position to bargain away
175. For more modest proposals that would both express society's commitment to
involved fatherhood and provide practical support to fathers engaged in caretaking, see
Holning Lau, Shaping Expectations About Dads as Caregivers: Toward an Ecological
Approach, 45 HOFSTRA L. REv. 183 (discussing access to diaper-changing tables in public
restrooms, government funding of "Mommy and Me" classes for small children, and the
representation of fathers in the federal government's Fatherhood Initiative). In California-
the state whose supreme court dismissed out-of-hand the notion that mothers should have a
say in parental claims to their children-the governor recently vetoed legislation that would
have required equal access to diaper-changing facilities in public places. California Governor
Rejects Bills To Help Men Change Diapers; REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2014, 4:45 AM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diaper-califomia-idUSKBN0FO5M
2 014092 0.
176. Cf Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions ofEqual Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 345-46 (1992) ("If one
considers the variety of methods the state has at its disposal to promote the welfare of the
unborn, it is easier to appreciate the substantial role that judgments about women play in
defining the incidence and structure of fetal-protective regulation.... [S]ome strategies of
fetal-protection impose the costs of protecting unborn life solely on women, while others
distribute them across the community as a whole. . . .").
177. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 147, at 82-83; see also JUNE
CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: How INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE
AMERICAN FAMILY (2014) (discussing how upper-class and upper-middle-class men benefit
from formal equality in custody determinations).
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property and support rights in order to keep their children."'
Moreover, demands for equal nghts in parenting-rather than equal
commitment o parenting-can effectively hold mothers responsible
not only for raising the children but also for supporting, facilitating,
and ensuring the success of the father-child relationship."'
In the genetic entitlement cases, we see the duty to facilitate
fatherhood imposed on women even while they are still pregnant. In
both judicial decisions and scholarly discussions, pregnant women are
described as lying or deceitful when they refuse a man's wish to
maintain a relationship during the pregnancy.' Although it is true
that the women in these cases often have told lies, the implication of
the descriptions is that a pregnant woman has a legal duty to invite the
genetic father to "participate" in the pregnancy. Despite the formal
nonexistence of such a duty, the courts have criticized pregnant
women for failing to alert men of the fact of pregnancy or keep them
apprised of their fetus's whereabouts."' They have worried that if
women have no such duty, men will be "forced" to stalk their ex-
lovers in order to keep tabs on their reproductive property.'82 This
canard is based on the assumption that a man who has sex with a
woman has thereby acquired a legal and moral right to the child she
may bear, an assumption the law should reject, not encourage with
statutory entitlements that award parental rights automatically based
on genes.
178. Margaret F. Brinig, PenaltyDefaults h Family Law: The Case of Child Custody,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 803, 807 (2006) ("The effect of this legislation [joint custody
legislation in Oregon] was to strengthen the power of noncustodial parents, since denial of
access to the children would give the right to terminate spousal or child support, change the
parenting plan, or obtain an award for 'makeup' visitation.... As far as the correlations and
regressions show, there was statistically significantly lower child support.").
179. See Margaret K. Dore, The "Friendly Parent" Concept: A Flawed Factor for
Child Custody, 6 Lov. J. PuB. INT. L. 41, 44 (2004) (describing the application of the friendly
parent doctrine to a case in which the mother was deemed the "unfriendly" parent for
insisting that the father spend time with the child during visitation).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 148-152 (discussing the Burbach & Lamanna
study).
181. This rhetoric leads to cases like Plotnick v. DeLuccia, 85 A.3d 1039 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2013), in which a putative father (unsuccessfully) sought an injunction ordering
the mother to notify him when she went in to labor and to allow him to be present for the
delivery.
182. See, eg., Robert 0. v. Russell K. (In m Robert 0.), 604 N.E.2d 99, 106 (N.Y.
1992) (Titone, J., concurring).
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3. Genetic Duties and Genetic Rights
Related to the question of automatic rights is a question of
automatic duties, a question Scott Altman has explored, arguing that
the ightto care for a particular child follows from the dutyto care for
that child.'" If we believe that a genetic parent has a moral duty to his
genetic child, Altman argues, then society has a duty to allow the
parent the opportunity to perform that duty. Going further, one could
argue that by denying this right and opportunity specifically to men,
the law discourages men from fulfilling their duty and sends an
antifeminist message about their role as parents. It follows, goes the
argument, that men should have a right of access to their genetic
children, in order to give them the chance to form the relationships on
which full-blown parental rights depend.
This conclusion, however, that men have a right of access to their
genetic children, brings us back to the question: a right against
whom? There is a difference between a man's right against state
interference with a parental relationship-or even with a potential
parental relationship-and his right to compel another individual to
form a relationship with him.'84 The state interferes with men's
chances to form relationships with children in multiple ways, even
when the children's mothers welcome the fathers' participation. For
example, under the one-parent doctrine, states routinely strip both
parents of parental rights if the mother is found to be neglectful;
usually the father is not even a party to the proceeding.' The United
States also incarcerates massive numbers of fathers with little to no
regard for their relationships with their children, and despite some
183. Altman, supra note 26, at 306-10. This article is contained in a volume, THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 26, which has forty
contributors, of whom thirty-six are men.
184. See Steve B.D. v. Swan (In r Steve B.D.), 730 P.2d 942, 945 (Idaho 1986)
(applying the state action doctrine to distinguish between state and private interference with
the father's ability to establish a relationship with his genetic child).
185. Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System's
Disregard for the Consditutional Rights ofNonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 55, 70-77
(2009) (describing two versions of the doctrine, one in which the second parent's rights are
automatically terminated and one in which the court retains legal custody but the
nonoffending parent may be allowed to have physical custody). The one-parent doctrine can
also be used to strip mothers of rights without due process, but the most common scenario is
that the mother is accused of neglect and the father is the marginal, ignored parent. A trend
has recently begun to emerge recognizing the unconstitutionality of the one-parent doctrine.
See Josh Gupta-Kagan, In re Sanders and the Resurrection ofStanley v. Illinois, 5 CALIF. L.
REv. CIRCUIT 383 (2014) (discussing a Michigan case); Sankaran, supra at 76-77 (describing
developments in Maryland and Pennsylvania).
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progress, the state maintains a social structure that favors traditional
breadwinner/homemaker arrangements over other family forms."'
These state actions interfere with parent-child relationships, and
specifically father-child relationships, on a vastly greater scale than
could be remedied by rights of genetic entitlement against mothers.
Another aspect of the "duty, hence rights" argument-not
pressed by Altman but common elsewhere-is the symmetry
argument, which focuses on legal rather than moral duties toward
children: many commenters believe it would be unfair if genetic
fathers could be automatically liable for child support but not,
symmetrically, automatically entitled to parental rights.' And indeed,
when law gets involved, the goal of promoting fatherhood tends to
devolve into a familiar emphasis on financial support.88 Many argue
that a regime that imposes child support duties on genetics alone must
also accord rights on the same basis.'
This argument is a variant of the complaint that reproductive
rights are unfair because they give women "all the power."' The
186. For examples of policies that a state would adopt if it were friendly to dual
parenting, see EICHNER, supra note 162 (discussing policy proposals to fit the needs of one-,
two-, or three-or-more-parent families); Deborah A. Widiss, Reconfiguring Sex, Gender, and
the Law of Mariage, 50 FAM. CT. REv. 205, 207-09 (2012) (discussing ways in which the
law and social norms encourage gender-based specialization within marriage).
187. See, e.g., Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unamed Fathers and the Constitudon:
Biology 'Plus' Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47 (2004). For a contrary view, see Scott Altman, A Theory ofChild
SuppoA 17 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 173 (2003) (arguing for greater public support for
children but also that private child support obligations might be imposed as a form of penalty
for, inter alia, "failing to establish a loving relationship with the child's other parent").
188. See supa note 53 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Oren, supa note 187.
190. Bachiochi, supra note 72, at 944; see also Lisa Lucile Owens, Coerced
Parenthood as Family Policy: Feminism, the Moral Agency of Women, and Men's 'Right to
Choose," 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REv. 1 (2013). Bachiochi's article purports to adopt and
build on the relational feminist framework that I set out in Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and
Soul: Equality, P%gnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
329 (2010) [hereinafter Hendricks, Body and Soul]. It uses my article both as a source of
several purported concessions from prochoice feminists-which the author treats as a
monolithic group-and as one of several straw women to rebut. The first, theoretical section
of the article claims to be grounded in relational feminism but instead advocates for separate
spheres. The characterization of Robin West's work is so inaccurate that it is difficult to
explain other than as intentional. Bachiochi, supra note 72, at 930-31. The article also makes
historical claims about the genesis of sex inequality. Bachiochi claims that sex inequality is
caused by legal and cultural acceptance of abortion and other denials of women's inherent
fertility. Id at 893 (stating that prochoice feminism cannot promote equality because it
"requires women to deny their fertility and reject their children"). Before 1973, apparently,
all women were regarded as mother-goddesses and lived happily on their pedestals.
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pregnant woman gets to decide whether to have an abortion, and if she
instead decides to bear a child, she gets to decide whether to exclude
the genetic father or to allow or even require him to participate. Any
chain of reasoning that begins with the assertion that pregnant women
are favored because they "get" to decide whether to abort or carry to
term should raise red flags for feminists. The abortion decision is a
right, yes, but it is also a responsibility, and under any guise it is not to
be envied. Women "get" to make these decisions for the same reason
that they "get" to become pregnant. The blessing and the curse are
not severable.19 '
In addition, the alleged symmetry is false. Women do not have
the option of forcing men to be involved in parenting.9 2 The most
they can do is obtain an order for financial support of the child, and
the false equivalency between paying child support and raising a child
is the core problem with symmetry arguments for men's rights.193
Finally, biological difference has a legitimate role to play in the
law of parental rights. As I have argued elsewhere, it is sometimes
appropriate to reason, carefully, from the body.'94 We do not have to
use sex-correlated physical characteristics (like capacity to gestate) as
foundations for spinning out an elaborate system of social roles. But
we also should not ignore that people live in bodies. Birth creates a
biologically unique relationship between mother and child. Women
should have greater decision-making authority over certain
The second, doctrinal section proceeds to adopt arguments that are directly at odds with
the earlier theoretical claims, fiercely embracing the reductionist formal equality of Geduldhg
v. Alello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Bachiochi's vision is not relational feminism's valuing of
bodies and activities that are culturally associated with the feminine. It is a vision of separate
spheres, in which living according to those values is mandatory for women. Although in her
theoretical sections she claims these values can be experienced by men as well, her doctrinal
arguments are ruthless in severing women from the public sphere and men from the family.
The animating spark of the article is not to theorize embodied equality, as the title
claims, but to rationalize the conclusion that "government may compel childbearing to
protect fetal life." Bachiochi, supra note 72, at 927. Rhetoric about women's equality serves
as window dressing for a theory that would give lip service to equal respect for men's and
women's separate spheres but rigidly reinforce the barrier between them.
191. See genedfly Hendricks, Body and Soul, supra note 190 (arguing that the right to
abortion is indivisible).
192. See Czapanskiy, supm note 115 (arguing that courts view fathers as volunteers
and mothers as draftees); Pollack & Mason, supra note 172, at 78-79 (describing reasons that
courts fail to require noncustodial parents to use their visitation time).
193. For further discussion of this false symmetry, see Jennifer S. Hendricks, The
Rape Survivos Child Custody Act: Wages of Genetic Entilement (forthcoming) (on file
with author).
194. Hendricks, Body and Soul, supranote 190, at 366.
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reproductive decisions because that authority is a necessary correlate
of their greater burden. It is not a matter of tit for tat, or payment for
services, but a matter of acknowledging the entanglement of bodies
and souls that inheres iii pregnancy and birth.195 Without denigrating
the "deep and proper concern" that a man may have in a pregnancy,
he is not situated to make initial decisions over whether a new being
should be brought into the world, and if so into what family."'
Genetic entitlement to children supports patriarchal rights over
women's bodies without requiring a shift toward more male
caretaking for children. Given the myriad ways that society might
promote and support involved fatherhood, feminists should not give
priority to a strategy that has questionable efficacy, costs society little,
diminishes individual women's autonomy, and symbolically embraces
a patriarchal theory of the family.
B. PressuredAdoption and Vulnerable Parents: Baby Girl as the
Modem Lehr
The second major reason why unwed fathers' rights have gained
feminist support is as a means for countering abuses in the adoption
industry, abuses which may harm birth fathers, birth mothers, and
children. Both historically and in the present, adoption abuses have
fallen most heavily on low-income and nonwhite families. As
discussed above, restrictions on unwed fathers' rights often serve the
interest of adopting parents more than they serve birth parents or
children. Stronger rights for unwed fathers are thus an attractive tool
for strengthening the overall position of birth parents relative to the
adoption industry.
For several reasons, the best legal context in which to consider
the merits of using fathers' rights in this way is the context of
adoptions governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)."' First,
the historic abuse of adoption to remove children from Native families
is well documented and broadly accepted by courts and other legal
actors.' Second, this history led Congress to enact ICWA, which
provides extra procedural and substantive protection for both parents
195. See generally id (arguing that a feminist theory of reproduction must consider
women's physiological experience of pregnancy).
196. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (striking
down a law requiring a wife to have her husband's consent in order to obtain an abortion).
197. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012).
198. See ifia text accompanying notes 204-208.
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and tribes when Indian children are removed from their birth families,
whether the removal is for adoption with a parent's consent or based
on allegations of child abuse or neglect.' Unlike with other
vulnerable communities, which are subject to more recent legislation
against "race-matching" and in favor of quick adoptions,200 Congress
has recognized social and individual value in keeping Indian children
in Indian homes. Finally, the Supreme Court has interpreted ICWA
on two occasions, most recently in a case, Adopdve Couple v Baby
Girl,201 that provides a set of facts for evaluating the merits of fathers'
rights as a tool for serving the ends of ICWA.
In Baby Girl, a father with no established relationship with his
child sought to block her adoption by an unrelated couple, an
adoption that the birth mother had sought. Under the reading of Lehr
set out above, he did not have parental rights because of the lack of
relationship.202 Congress, however, had arguably granted him greater
rights, under ICWA, to block the adoption in order to promote the
goal of keeping Indian children in Indian families. Although the
Supreme Court ultimately construed ICWA more narrowly as not
providing rights for this particular father, that holding seems plainly at
odds with the intent of the statute and at least somewhat likely to be
narrowed in the future.203 Alternatively, Congress might ultimately
overrule the Court on this point by passing a law that more explicitly
gives a genetic entitlement to the genetic father of an Indian child.
199. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911-1923 (ICWA provisions for child custody proceedings).
An "Indian child" under ICWA is any child who either is a tribal member or is eligible for
tribal membership and has a biological parent who is a tribal member. Id. § 1903 (4).
Classification as an Indian child is thus distinct from both tribal membership and Native
ancestry.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (restricting the use of race in matching children to adoptive
parents); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (imposing deadlines in child welfare cases to
promote adoption by new parents over family reunification).
201. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
202. The Supreme Court did not consider whether the biology-plus-relationship test
was satisfied because the father made a statutory claim under ICWA rather than a
constitutional claim. It did, however, construe the father's prebirth conduct as abandonment
and conclude that he had no right under ICWA to block the adoption because he had never
had custody of the child. Id. at 2557. This holding could indicate that the Court would take a
strict view of the biology-plus-relationship test-requiring postbirth custody for some period
of time-but the focus on custody is more likely due to the specific language of ICWA. See
id. at 2560 (highlighting § 1912(f) of ICWA, which refers to "continued custody").
203. See Berger, supm note 78, at 311-19 (analyzing the statute and the Court's




The question, then, for this Article, is whether that grant of
rights-and the diminishment of the mother's existing rights that is
entailed-is justified by. the aims of ICWA. As in subpart IVA, I
argue here that the costs of such a grant-the symbolic endorsement
of patriarchy and the power it removes from individual women-are
substantial. In this case, however, there is also better reason to think
that fathers' rights could have a direct, practical effect that would be
positive overall. Nonetheless, other strategies would better address
the problem without the cost to mothers' rights.
1. ICWA and Beyond: Adoption as a Tool of Subordination
ICWA arose from Congress's recognition that the United States
had long used removal of Native children from their families as a tool
of genocide.204 In the nineteenth century, the U.S. Army established
boarding schools for Native children, who were removed from their
homes en masse.205 Under the mantra of "killing the Indian to save the
man," the directors of the school prohibited any expression of
indigenous culture or language in the children's speech, dress, or
religious practices.206 They were often abused in other ways as well.20
The goal was to assimilate Native children into white culture so that
Native cultures would cease to exist.08 While this goal could be
achieved by raising the children in institutions cut off from their
communities, it could also be facilitated by having white families
adopt Native children.
It is this history that stands in the background of any adoption
proceeding involving an Indian child. Moreover, histories of abuse
204. Congress did not put it quite that way. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (finding that "an
alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive
homes and institutions; and ... that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often
failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families"); see also Manuel P. Guerrero,
Indan Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Response to the Threat to Incan Culture Caused by
Foster andAdoptive Placements ofindan Children, 7 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 51 (1979).
205. See STEVE HENDRICKS, THE UNQUIET GRAVE: THE FBI AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE SOUL OF INDIAN COUNTRY 30-31 (2006) [hereinafter HENDRICKS, THE UNQUIET GRAVE];
Berger, supra note 78, at 350-51.
206. HENDRICKS, THE UNQUIET GRAVE, supr note 205, at 31.
207. Id
208. Berger, supra note 78, at 351 ("Indian children would be taught to be non-
Indians.").
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pervade the adoption experiences of many communities. The white
"child-saving" movement of the early twentieth century was based on
a similar theory that children from undesirable families could be
saved by being raised in institutions or in "better" homes.209 Although
African American children were not until recently considered
adoptable by white families, they nonetheless were targeted for
removal for other reasons, and the disproportionate removal of poor
children and children of color continues today.210
Even with ICWA in place, some participants in the child welfare
system appear to have little regard either for the statute's aims or for
its procedural requirements. For example, the Oglala and Rosebud
Sioux recently won a summary judgment order against a South
Dakota judge and other state officials for egregious procedural abuses
in removal proceedings.21' The following is a sampling of the
violations:
[ex pare communicadon, no notce ofallegadons]
The defendants acknowledge Seventh Circuit judges receive an
ICWA affidavit prior to the 48-hour hearing, but the affidavit is not
marked as a hearing exhibit....
. . . In a number of transcripts there are specific exchanges with
a judge in which an Indian parent asked about the allegations
against them or why their children were removed.... In none of
these hearings did a Deputy States Attorney, DSS representative or
the judge contradict the statements of the Indian parents or counsel
or recess the proceedings to allow the parties to receive and review
the ICWA affidavit and petition for temporary custody.212
[denial of the ight to counsel and the ight to present evidence]
209. Cf Dorothy E. Roberts, Black Club Women and Child Welfare: Lessons for
Modem Reform, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 957 (2005) (describing the contemporaneous but
differently structured child-saving efforts of African American women, which emphasized
supporting mothers more than removing children). See genemlly J. Herbie DiFonzo,
Deprived of 'Fatal Liberty'" The Rhetoric of Child Saving and the Reality of Juveile
Incarcelation, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 855 (1995) (discussing the child-saving movement); Kari
E. Hong, Parens Painfarchyj Adoption, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples, 40 CAL. W. L.
REv. 1, 11-31 (2003) (providing a historical overview of adoption in the United States).
210. See genezally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATrERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE (2002) (analyzing disproportionate impact of child protective services on African
American families).
211. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749 (D.S.D. 2015).
212. Id. at 758 (citations omitted).
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Judge Davis advised Indian parents there was no need for an
attorney because of the option to work informally with DSS for 60
days....
Judge Davis and the other Seventh Circuit judges presiding over
48-hour hearings (all jointly referred to as the "Seventh Circuit
judges") never advised any Indian parent or custodian they had a
right to contest the state's petition for temporary custody during the
48-hour hearing. The Seventh Circuit judges never advised Indian
parents they had a right to call witnesses at the 48-hour hearing. ...
... Every time the Seventh Circuit judges agreed during a 48-
hour hearing to appoint counsel for indigent parents, the judges
delayed the appointment of counsel until after granting DSS
custody.23
[falsification offactualfindhgs-]
The Seventh Circuit judges never required the State to present
sworn testimony from a live witness.
The Seventh Circuit judges used a standardized temporary
custody order which functioned as a checklist. Following 48-hour
hearings in which no witness testified and no documents were
offered or received as evidence, the Seventh Circuit judges placed
checkmarks next to findings of fact without providing any
explanation regarding the basis for their findings. The Seventh
Circuit judges signed temporary custody orders detailing findings
of fact that had never been described on the record or explained to
the Indian parents present at the 48-hour hearing.214
These procedures, used to remove children from parents, even when
they had lawyers present in the courtroom, were not only violations of
ICWA; under no stretch of the imagination did they come even close
to minimally acceptable due process. While the summary judgment
from the federal court may augur changes in this particular court, it
took a year of class action litigation to reach that point.
The facts in Adoptive Couple v Baby Gil illustrate some of the
less egregious, but likely more common, resistance to ICWA in state
court proceedings. The adopting couple and their representatives took
several steps to manipulate the "facts on the ground" with respect to
the child's custody before taking belated steps to comply with
213. Id. at 760-61 (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 761 (citations omitted).
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ICWA.2 5 For example, when they gave notice to the Cherokee Nation
of the pending adoption, they misspelled the father's name and listed
the wrong date of his birth.2 6 While these errors may merely have
been clerical mistakes, critics have good reason to distrust and instead
infer bad faith. Even if not intentional, the mistakes are the sort of
shoddy compliance with procedure that suggests lack of regard for the
law's aims.2 7
The Supreme Court's ultimate decision in Baby Girl suggested
that the Court, too, had failed to embrace ICWA's goals. Couching its
decision in vague-and unfounded-suggestions that ICWA's
definition of "Indian child" might be an unconstitutional racial
classification, the majority seized on the allegation that Baby Girl was
only "3/256 Cherokee."218  This figure probably understates Baby
Girl's Native ancestry, but regardless of its accuracy the figure is
irrelevant.219 To be an "Indian child" is a political classification that
refers to eligibility for tribal membership. Baby Girl is 100%
Cherokee in the same sense that Barack Obama and Ted Cruz are
100% American. The circumstances of their birth entitle them to
citizenship in the nation.220 in Cruz s case, as with Baby Girl, that
birthright derived not from the place of birth but by inheritance from
his citizen parent; like tribal membership, most systems for
determining citizenship depend at least in part on the parent's political
status. As Bethany Berger has discussed, the Baby Girl majority
ignored the political character of tribal membership and instead tried
to characterize ICWA as a race-specific statute, the application of
which should be "limited to a small and racially defined group."221
Berger also explains how the Court's narrative fits into a
historical pattern of "expectation and insistence on the absorption and
215. Berger, supra note 78, at 305.
216. Id. at 302-05.
217. This lack of regard may emanate from the birth mother, if she wants to avoid the
genetic father's participation, as well as from other actors in the system.
218. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2559 (2013).
219. See Berger, supm note 78, at 327-29 (explaining that the Dawes Rolls, on which
the figure is based, understate Native ancestry for various reasons and reporting that Baby
Girl's mother may also have had Cherokee ancestry that was not included in the 3/256).
220. See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membelshnb, and Tribal
Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041 (2012). To the extent that political entities define
citizenship in terms of genetic descent, that definition may be problematically patriarchal in
ways that are similar to the criticisms I have made of the genetic definition of parenthood.
Different considerations, however, are at play, and a discussion of the meaning of citizenship
and its transmission is beyond the scope of this Article.
221. Berger, supra note 78, at 330.
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disappearance of indigenous peoples."222 By rejecting "[t]he
possibility that a child could remain politically Indian after
generations of intermarriage," the majority's decision promoted "the
assumption that Indian tribes would eventually disappear."223
In sum, there is not merely a long history of wrongful removals
of children that ended when ICWA became law. That history
continues to this day, for Native families as well as other communities
vulnerable to abuses in both the adoption industry and the child
welfare system.
As compared to the "stalled revolution" argument, this historical
pattern is more concrete and has more discretely identifiable harms.
Subpart IVA considered the possibility of enhancing the rights of
genetic fathers mostly in the hope that doing so would harness the
expressive power of the law, proclaiming that fathers are inherently
connected with children in the hope that cultural change would
somehow trickle down from the law's proclamation. The fuzziness of
this aspiration is part of why it does not strike me as worth the
sacrifice of mothers' autonomy. In contrast, the particularized harm
of a long history of wrongful removals makes a stronger case for
adopting a remedy, even at the cost of trimming some other
constitutional rights. Nonetheless, it is worth noting those costs and
evaluating their sacrifice with skepticism. A system of genetic
entitlement still has serious flaws, and other, better solutions to the
wrongful removal of children are available.
2. Genetic Entitlement: Flaws in the Approach
Given the history described above, any legal tool that impedes
the adoption process may appear desirable. While the goal may not
be to eliminate all adoptions of children with fit parents, slowing
222. Id. at 330.
223. Id. at 332. There is an additional rhetorical effect to the repeated invocation of
blood quantum to suggest hat Baby Girl was "really white." Emphasizing her whiteness as a
reason not to apply ICWA is more than just a question of statutory interpretation. It appeals
to the intuition that a white child is harmedby being treated as an Indian child. In this way,
the Baby Giropinion was similar to the lower court opinions that were reversed by an earlier
Supreme Court in Palmore v. Sidod In that case, the state courts had removed a child from
her mother and transferred custody to the father because the mother had married a black man.
The harm to the child that justified this transfer was that she would be taunted or scorned by
the white community-in other words, that she would experience racism. Palmore v. Sidob
466 U.S. 429 (1984). Both cases thus illustrate that courts see the loss of white privilege as a
substantial harm, if inflicted on a child they perceive as white. In Baby Gir, the adopting
parents and their upper-middle-class tatus represented the white privilege that was at stake.
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down the process and requiring adoption agencies to clear more legal
hurdles is likely to eliminate some cases of abuse.
Those extra hurdles, however, need not consist of entitlements
for genetic fathers. As an initial matter, the concern about adoption
abuse is only partly a concern about the harm to individual parents
and children. The critique of aggressive adoption policies is rooted in
commitments to pluralism, and the objection is to the appropriation of
children from subordinated social groups by the dominant group.
From a pluralistic perspective, strong protections for birth mothers-
such as those discussed in the next section-should be sufficient
protection. In fact, strong rights for mothers is more pluralistic than a
regime that relies on fathers' rights to slow down adoption, since
mothers would remain freer to choose nonnuclear or nonheterosexual
family forms.
To strengthen fathers' rights instead of mothers' arguably serves
pluralism only when the mother is committed to placing the child for
adoption, which usually entails moving the child from a minority or
low-income community to a white, middle-class or wealthy
community. When the father objects, giving him a veto over the
adoption based on genetics alone will keep the child in the original
community, arguably serving pluralist ends (although only arguably,
since the outcome also reinforces the heterosexual family).
This result is obtained by giving the father power over the
mother, power that, like power in the adoption process, can be abused.
For example, some of the facts of Baby Girl suggest that the father
initially tried to use the child to retain control over the mother. Baby
Girl's mother texted the father shortly after the birth asking him
whether he would prefer to pay child support or to give up his parental
rights. He responded that he would give up his rights.224 In court, he
testified that he only said this to try to get the mother to marry him.
225
It is unclear to me why anyone thinks this motivation casts him in a
favorable light. What it suggests to me is that his interest at that time
was not in the child herself but in reacquiring his ex-girlfriend. The
fact that he may have wanted a package deal of wife and child
together does not make this motivation one we should support through
legal entitlements.
224. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2013).
225. Berger, supra note 78, at 301.
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Similarly, the father in Baby GI- also testified that he
relinquished his parental rights on the assumption that the mother was
going to keep and raise the child, stating that he would not have
signed the papers if he had known of the adoption plan.22 6 Again,
many observers seem to think that his insistence on the mother raising
his genetic child is somehow praiseworthy. As noted above, I agree
with those who condemn the procedural shenanigans involved in this
deception, but I fail to see why we should sympathize with the father's
apparent goal of coercing his ex-girlfriend to marry and raise a child
with him. For some men, possibly including this father, refusing
consent to the adoption is a way not of making or preserving a
connection to the child but of maintaining control over the mother.227
This possibility of manipulation is one of the reasons why "do
anything that reduces adoptions" is not an appropriate response to the
pluralistic concern about adoption abuse. There is a difference
between the systemic problems played out through the adoption
system and the choices made by individuals. While pressuring or
coercing a birth mother to place a child for adoption is always wrong,
a freely chosen adoption is not, even when the word freelymust come
with substantial caveats. There are many circumstances that may lead
a woman to place a child for adoption; some of them-poverty being
the most common-are unjust and lead to a woman choosing
adoption when she would rather be in different circumstances and
keep the child. Eliminating those unjust circumstances is an urgent
priority of reproductive justice, but overruling a woman's decision
about how to cope with them in the here and now will not further that
cause. It will only exacerbate the injustice.
226. Baby Gr, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
227. When Baby Girl's father sought to undo the adoption, the state court required
him to show not only a legal defect in the proceeding but also that she would not be harmed
by being removed from her adoptive parents and that a transfer of custody was in her best
interests; this occurred when she was two years old. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731
S.E.2d 550 (S.C. 2012), rev'd 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). By the time the Supreme Court
rendered its decision, Baby Girl was four years old and had lived with her biological father
and his wife for eighteen months. Baby GMrl, 133 S. Ct. at 2559. The state courts then
ordered that the father's rights be terminated and the adoption finalized without any
consideration of the current facts of Baby Girl's life. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746
S.E.2d 51 (S.C. 2013), af'4 746 S.E.2d 346 (S.C. 2013).
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3. Other Solutions: Protections for Birth Mothers
To protect vulnerable families from losing children, we should
reform the systems that remove children from their homes rather than
give genetic entitlements to fathers. That means making changes to
both the adoption and the child welfare systems. These reforms
would serve the goals of pluralism at least as well as genetic
entitlements for fathers to veto adoptions.
Regarding adoption, the hard, long-term reforms that are needed
include the panoply of social changes that would prevent putting
women in the position of giving up a child because of poverty or other
unjust circumstances. That means ensuring that women can choose
when to become pregnant and give birth, as well as supporting all
parents with the social resources they need to raise their children.
More immediately, and more directly in the province of family law,
are reforms of the adoption process to protect birth mothers from
pressure to relinquish children: providing birth mothers with
appropriate counseling advice, clear and accurate information about
the consequences of the adoption, a reasonable amount of time to
make a final decision, and special protections for underage mothers.
228
On the question of time alone, the United States is an outlier in the
pressure that birth mothers experience to make a final decision about
adoption. In most European countries and in Australia, consent to
adoption does not become final until approximately six months after
the birth, but in the United States it can become irrevocable in as little
as a few days.229
Moreover, some portion of unwed father litigation could be
avoided if birth mothers received stronger protection in the adoption
process. Many of the unwed father cases litigated in state courts in
228. See Samuels, supra note 129; Seymore, supm note 129. In addition to protecting
the birth mother's autonomy regarding the adoption decision itself, greater procedural
protections can also help strengthen the birth mother's position regarding the terms of the
adoption; birth mothers increasingly choose adoptive parents for their infants and negotiate
various levels of postadoption contact with the new family. See generlly Carol Sanger,
Bargaiing for Motherhood: Postadoption Visitadon Agreements, 41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 309,
314-15 (2012) (discussing the social changes that led to birth mothers having greater
bargaining power, which they used to gain control over the selection of adoptive parents and
to negotiate for postadoption contact).
229. Samuels, supo note 129, at 513 ("In approximately half the U.S. states, however,
irrevocable consent can be established in as short a period as less than four days after birth; in
approximately ten percent of the states, it can be established in less than seven days after
birth; and in approximately fifteen percent of the states, it can be established in less than two
weeks after birth.").
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fact involve the birth mother as well as the genetic father seeking to
reclaim the child. For example, in the high-profile "Baby Jessica"
case, state law required that a birth mother's release of parental rights
for adoption must be signed more than three days after the birth.230
The mother signed the papers too soon and then sought to revoke her
consent to the adoption; she also claimed that her consent was
procured through fraud or coercion.2 3' Adding to her legal
ammunition, the mother enlisted the biological father, whose rights
had not been properly terminated under state law (which provided a
genetic entitlement despite the lack of caretaking relationship). Even
though the mother had a plausible claim in her own right, it was mired
in procedural questions about jurisdiction and waiver.232 The courts
therefore resolved the case, in favor of the birth parents, on the basis
of the father's claim.2 33 The category of "unwed fathers" appears to
include some substantial number of similar cases, in which the claim
was actually initiated by the mother, relying on the father's genetic
entitlement because her own rights were relinquished or lost.234
Reforms to adoption procedures like those discussed above would
help prevent these cases from occurring because the birth mother's
rights would be better protected.
Although the question of father's rights arises most frequently in
the context of adoption, the greater risk to vulnerable families-the
mechanism by which the largest numbers of children are removed
from poor and minority communities-is not voluntary infant
adoption but removal by child protective services. This Article has
focused on the unwed father adoption cases because those cases are a
primary battleground in the symbolic struggle over the meaning of
230. Ine B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1992).
231. Id
232. See id. at 241.
233. Id at 246-47.
234. The number of such cases is unknown. When Burbach and Lamanna analyzed
the rhetoric of unwed father decisions, they identified five of their twenty-seven cases as
"Reconciliation" cases. Burbach & Lamanna, supra note 148, at 163. The purpose of their
study, however, was not to determine the proportion of cases that would fall in this category,
and their sample may not be representative or large enough for this purpose. Most
importantly, their selection criteria required that the opinion include some "characterization
or evaluation of the biological mother," a criterion that might be met by some types of cases
more than others. Id at 162. In addition, a court may not necessarily mention the mother's
presence in the background of the case (most that do mention it do so only in passing)
because she has no legal standing. Anecdotally, the presence of the birth mother in support
of the father's claim strikes me as a frequent feature of litigation premised on the rights of the
father alone, although not in the majority of cases.
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parenthood: whether it will be defined in terms of relationships or
instead as a genetic entitlement, which I have argued is patriarchy in
modem guise. The privileges of patriarchy, however, are linked not
just to gender but to race and class, and disparities in those privileges
are evident in the child welfare context as they are in adoption. As
discussed above, states have adopted the substantive rule of genetic
entitlement, which symbolically maintains patriarchy, while using
procedural barriers to limit some men's ability to exercise this
privilege.235 Similarly, the child welfare system's one-parent doctrine,
also discussed above, unfairly excludes men from parenthood.236 The
doctrine is unfair in at least two ways. First, it ignores the biology-
plus-relationship test and so violates the Supreme Court's one clear
holding from the unwed father cases, that a father with an established
relationship with the child has the same parental rights as the
mother.237 Second, even if the father does not meet the biology-plus-
relationship test, his inchoate interest in the child outweighs any claim
that the state has to the child. All of the arguments in this Article for
restricting genetic claims apply only to claims against the mother. If
the mother has died or been found guilty of abuse, then the father's
claim is not against the mother but against the state, which
dramatically shifts what is at stake. It is ironic-and, in my view, an
indication of its grounding in patriarchy rather than the interests of
children-that genetic entitlement is at its strongest when the father
seeks to overrule the mother's decisions but at its weakest when he
competes with the state.
Reforms of the adoption and child welfare systems are urgently
needed to protect vulnerable communities and families from losing
children. Systemic reforms would do so without the need for genetic
entitlements that give men automatic access to children and control
over their mothers.
V. CONCLUSION
Our systems for protecting child welfare are riddled with
injustice, and there is scant basis for optimism about any imminent
reform. Compared to the complex and daunting challenges posed by
real reform, a more immediate fix in the form of genetic entitlements
235. See supra subpart II.B.
236. See supm note 185 and accompanying text.
237. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see Gupta-Kagan, supra note 185
(arguing for the application of Stanleyto strike down the one-parent doctrine).
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has some appeal. The fix, however, is superficial, and as in the case
of using rights to encourage caretaking, it tries to solve a social
problem that mostly harms women by giving more rights and power
to their male partners. Moreover, it does so using a male-centered
definition of parenthood that ignores real-life relationships in favor of
abstract genetic entitlements. Rather than promote the superficial
theory of equality that drives the genetic definition of parenthood,
feminists should seek to restore and strengthen the focus on
caretaking, working for reforms that protect existing parent-child
relationships instead of patriarchal demands for authority over women
and children.
